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This is a study of backward linkages in emerging mineral economies in Sub-Saharan 
Africa as a potential driver of industrial development in the region. The study covers 
two sub-sectors namely the exploration and production in a case study of Tanzania‟s 
large-scale gold mining operations. For data collection, the study used open-ended 
interviews, semi-structured interviews, observations and reviewed relevant 
secondary documents. Based on the two case-studies, the study makes the following 
broad findings: (i) the Tanzanian large-scale gold mining sector is dominated by 
multinational companies (MNCs), (ii) the MNCs source high critical and high complex 
goods and services mostly through long established external supply channels. Local 
content is limited to low critical products, such as food and beverages, (iii) there is 
virtually no local value-added in imported high critical and high complex goods and 
services, and (iv) there is higher volume of local content in the exploration sub-sector 
than in the production sub-sector. The study concludes that linkages are determined 
by both public and private sector policies. The main public policy problem is 
government failure to translate and implement long-term macro policy vision (Vision 
2025) to sectoral policies (the mining sector policy) with appropriate sanctions and 
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The difference between resource-abundant countries that are successful (e.g. 
Norway) and those that are not (e.g. Nigeria) is how well the political, economic and 
social structures of the country are managed. Successful resource-abundant 
countries are characterised by factors that generate sustainable integration of the 
mineral sector to the rest of the economy. In these economies the natural resources 
sector give rise to the development of manufacturing and services industry; that is 
the natural resources sector develops sustainable local linkages. This study is 
prompted by the gap between the development outcomes of successful resource-
abundant countries and their not successful counterparts. 
 
Tanzania the focus of this study is endowed with vast mineral, petroleum and gas 
deposits as well as diverse flora and fauna. Yet, in spite of this bountiful natural 
endowment, Tanzania is still one of the poorest countries in the world today, heavily 
dependent on agriculture and with poorly developed industrial and service sectors. 
Using the value chain framework approach and focusing on two sub-chains, the 
exploration and the production sub-chains of the country‟s large-scale gold mining 
value chain, the study sought to examine the nature and determinants of linkages in 
these two sub-chains.  
 
Through interviews with mining firms, exploration firms and exploration departments 
of mining, government officials, government agencies officials and, industry goods 
and services suppliers, observations and review of relevant documents the study 
made the following broad findings; (i) exploration and production(mining) activities 
are dominated by Multinational Corporations (MNCs), (ii) these MNCs often use 
utilise long established external suppliers of goods and services, (iii)  in both sub-
chains highly critical supplies (critical to the buyers) of goods and services are largely 
imported with virtually no local value addition. Local supplies are limited to low critical 
supplies such as food and beverages and, (iv) the exploration sub-chain utilises 
comparatively more local linkages in both anchor firms and suppliers compared to 
the production sub-chain.  
 
Cognisant of the importance of adequate and appropriate skill, soft and hard 
infrastructure, the study concludes that the major determinant of linkages in the two 
sub-chains was the public and private sector policy framework and the willingness 
and capacity of government to implement policy. Beyond a general commitment to 
local sourcing, at a micro-level the buying firms have no effective policies to develop 
and utilise local linkages and are not actively developing local capacity. The firms are 
taking advantage of liberal trade policies that permit unrestricted importation of goods 
and services destined for the sector. The implementation of public policy measures 
formulated to develop and deepen local linkages was identified as the key missing 
component of the policy framework. The study concludes by suggesting improved 
translation of Tanzania‟s grand industrialisation policy, Vision 2025, into specific 
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The effects of the September 2008 financial collapse are still felt worldwide. 
Governments have adopted and are continuing to adopt austerity measures to 
balance national accounts. Countries like the Republic of Ireland once viewed as an 
economic success story have had to borrow substantial amounts of money from 
international financial institutes to stay afloat. Despite numerous gloomy economic 
growth predictions the mineral commodities sector has recovered remarkably 
bringing welcome relief to producers. Virtually all commodity prices have appreciated 
with March 2011 oil prices at over US$120 per barrel the highest in the post collapse 
era.   
 
Driven by strong demand in China and India commodity demand is expected to stay 
strong. For mineral commodity and oil producing developing countries in sub-
Saharan African (SSA) and elsewhere, the exploitation of the commodities presents 
both threats and opportunities to economic development efforts. In many economies, 
the potential benefits of revenue realised from the exploitation of mineral 
commodities and oil over many decades have not materialised, with a number of 
resource-abundant countries failing to utilise realised revenue to the benefit of their 
citizens. Also these countries have failed to effect mineral sector driven 
industrialisation and progress from developing countries status to emerging market 
economies status. This poor outcome referred to as the resource curse is 
documented by a large body of literature (see Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1997 and 
2001; and Stevens, 2003, for examples). 
 
The resource curse literature attributes the outcome of natural resources exploitation 
to economic and political transmission mechanisms. Under the economic 
transmission mechanism, the literature distinguishes two economic transmission 
mechanisms; the macroeconomic and the microeconomic mechanisms. The Dutch 
Disease where overvalued real exchange rates undermine international 
competitiveness is an often cited macroeconomic mechanism (see Auty, 2004). The 
argument that a dominant primary sector based on the extraction of natural 
resources crowds out investment in other economic sectors and the policy choices to 
find the right mix between investment and consumption spending is often cited as a 
microeconomic transmission mechanism (Stevens and Dietsche, 2008). 
 
Political transmission focuses on policy actions and measures countering the various 
macroeconomic and microeconomic transmission mechanisms as making the 
difference between countries that benefit from mineral resource exploitation and 
those that do not. Literature explains the failure to pursue beneficial policies under 
two broad arguments, the structural and agency-based arguments (ibid). The 
structural arguments states that poor performance arises when governments use 
resource revenue to consolidate themselves and conserve „bad‟ political regimes 
undermining the social and cultural changes that facilitate democratic transitions and 
consolidations elsewhere. For instance, revenue is at times used to pacify powerful 
constituencies and where conflict arises the revenue is used to employ internal 
security to control domestic opponents instead of investing in productive and 
sustainable ventures. Agency-based arguments centre on those who wield political 
and other forms of power that enable them to determine policies and agendas in a 
country. Typically in many developing resource-abundant countries politicians, army 
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personnel or bureaucrats wield this power in varying degrees. The agency argument 
states that in less successful countries these constituencies take personal advantage 
of natural resource wealth. They engage in rent seeking, corrupt political and 
business practices and thus rob their countries of the opportunities that resource 
revenues could provide (Stevens and Dietsche, 2008). 
 
The upshot of these arguments is that the resource curse in not an inevitable 
outcome but a case of policy failure. David and Wright (1997) cite the positive 
outcomes of the United States of America and Cappelen and Mjøset (2009) cite the 
Norwegian experience in presenting their anti-resources curse arguments. The 
Making the Most of Commodities Programme (MMCP-see  
http://commodities.open.ac.uk)  which frames this Report adopts the view that the 
economic outcomes of the exploitation of SSA natural resources is dependent on the 
policy response taken by both  private and public sector stakeholders on the modus 
operandi of exploiting these resources. The programme notes a knowledge gap 
about how these stakeholders have responded to the exploitation of these 
commodities in SSA.  
 
This research seeks to identify those factors which have a bearing on the outcome to 
inform policy makers. Using the value chain framework approach (see Kaplinsky and 
Morris, 2001) the research is conducted through a case study of the nature, extent 
and determinants of linkages in the gold mining sector of Tanzania, the fourth largest 
producer of gold in Africa after South Africa, Ghana and Mali. Gold is a very 
important commodity which survived the September 2008 financial collapse. Firm 
current and projected growth in gold prices is premised on two demand sources. First 
there is strong demand from China and India for gold as jewellery, store of value and 
industrial use. Second, gold has begun to resume its historic role as a reserve 
currency. This preference is driven by the weakness and volatility of major currencies 
such as the United States of America‟s dollar (US Dollar) and the Euro, which is 
driving investors and countries to shift their reserve storages from the volatile hard 
currencies to the stable and appreciating gold to maintain value. This shift in reserves 
has given rise to a renewed „gold boom‟ resulting in increased activity in the gold 
mining sector. Priced at a US$ 1 400 per ounce1  gold prices are historical the 
highest at least in nominal terms. For Tanzania, a country with an estimated 2% of 
the world‟s gold reserves the need to make the most of these reserves calls for the 
identification and understanding of drivers of developing sustainable linkages to the 
country‟s gold mining sector now operating in a liberal environment.  An 
understanding of the drivers may be useful in guiding policymakers formulate and 
implement appropriate policies.   
 
2.0 Organization of the report. 
 
The report adopts the following sequence; section 2 provides the contextual 
background of the global and Tanzanian gold mining sector, identifying the leading 
producer countries and firms, reviewing and analysing secondary data sources on 
linkages in gold mining sector globally and in Tanzania specifically. Section 3 outlines 
the methodological approach the study adopted, section 4 presents the evidence of 
                                                          
1
 Price as at 1 March 2011. See- http://silver-and-gold-prices.goldprice.org/2011_03_01_archive.html 
(Accessed 12 March 2011) 
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the nature and extent of linkages in Tanzania and section 5 discusses the influence 
of the six MMCP issues on the nature and extent of the linkages. The section also 
discusses policy as the major driver of the extent and nature of the identified 
linkages. Finally section 6 summarizes the key conclusions, implications of the study 
and makes recommendations for future studies.  
 
3.0 Gold production 
 
Historically gold production has been dominated by a few countries namely South 
Africa, the United States of America (USA), Canada, Australia and the former Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). South Africa has been the leading producer of 
gold. At peak the country accounted for almost 60% of the world‟s mine production2. 
Declining and deeper deposits have seen South Africa lose its dominance to be the 
third largest gold producer in world as at December 2009. South Africa‟s declining 
fortunes though the most significant are not isolated. Table 1 give the top eight gold 
producing countries. The table indicates that production from the USA and Australia 
has been declining as well.  
 
Table 1: Gold production ranking 2000-2010 
2000 Country Production in tonnes Ranking 




Ranking  2007 2008 2009 
South 
Africa 
427 1 China 
276 285 300 
1 
U.S.A. 353 2 Australia 246 220 215 2 
Australia 296 3 South 
Africa 254 213 215 
3 
China 172 4 U.S.A. 238 210 215 4 
Canada 154 5 Russia 145 176 185 5 
Russia 142 6 Peru 170 180 180 6 
Peru 134 7 Canada 101 90 95 7 
Indonesia 124 8 Indonesia 118 60 100 8 
Source: compiled from Chaize, 2010 and Goldsheet Mining directory3 
 
Outside the top eight is a group of about 90 smaller countries with production below 
100 tonnes of gold per annum. Each of these counties has at least one mine that 
produces gold. Together the 90 countries produce over half of the production of the 
top 8 gold producing countries. Chaize (2009) lists the most important in this group 
as: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ghana Kazakhstan, Mali, Morocco, 
Mexico, Papua, Philippines and Tanzania. The countries have cushioned declining 
global production from the traditional producers. Commentator (see-GFSM, 2002) 
argues that global production decline could have been worse without the collective 
production from these countries. Global gold production is dominated by a few firms. 
Table 2 gives the top ten (globally) gold mining firms based on market capitalization.  
 
Table 2: Top ten gold mining firms (ranked by market capitalization as at 
October 2010). 






Toronto, Canada 27, Dominican Republic, USA, Peru, 
Chile, Argentina, Australia, Papua 
34.5 
                                                          
2
See-http://www.goldsheetlinks.com/production.htm (accessed September, 2010) 
3
See- http://www.goldsheetlinks.com/production.htm (accessed September, 2010) 
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New Guinea and Tanzania 
Gold Corp Inc Vancouver, Canada 12, Argentina, Honduras, Guatemala, 
Mexico, USA and Canada  
31 
Newmount Mining Denver Colorado, 
USA 
11, Ghana, Indonesia, New Zealand 
Australia, Mexico, USA, Canada and 
Peru 
22.8 
Kinross Gold Corp Toronto, Canada 8, Chile, Brazil, USA and Russia 16 
AngloGold Ashanti Johannesburg, South 
Africa 
21, South Africa, Namibia, Tanzania, 
Guinea (Republic), Ghana, Australia, 




Toronto, Canada 5, Canada, Mexico and Finland 11.5 
Gold Fields Inc Johannesburg, South 
Africa 
9, Ghana, South Africa and Peru 10.3 
Compania de Minas 
Buenaventura 
Peru 7, Peru 9.8 
Yamana Gold Inc Toronto, Canada 7, Argentina, Chile and Brazil 8.8 
Lihir Gold  Papua New Guinea 4,  Papua New Guinea, CÔte d‟Ivoire 
and Australia 
7.1 
Source: Money Energy, 2010. (see-http://www.getmoneyenergy.com/2009/10/top-
largest-global-gold-stocks/ accessed 30 October 2010). 
Canadian firms make up 50% of the top ten firms.  Other notable big firms are from 
the USA (Newmont Mining) and South Africa (AngloGold Ashanti and Goldfields).  A 
typical feature of the big firms is that they have global mining operations in both the 
developed and developing world. For instance AngloGold Ashanti, a major global 
gold company has mining operations on four continents Africa, North and South 
America and Australia including gold exploration interests being pursued on these 
continents.4 
Two of the top ten gold producing firms, Barrick Gold operating as African Barrick 
Gold (ABG) and AngloGold Ashanti have operations in Tanzania. 
3.1 The gold mining value chain 
The process of finding, extracting, processing and marketing gold is embedded in a 
stream of activities comprising of suppliers of products and services at each stage. 
These interactions between the main and supporting actors at each stage of the gold 
mining industry make up the gold mining value chain. Figure 1 is a simplified 
presentation of the global gold mining value chain.  
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Figure 1: The global gold mining value chain 
Source: This figure was developed by the author based on interviews with 
exploration firms in Tanzania (Interviews 2010) and MBendi Information services.5  
The value chain is divided into four broad sections namely;  (i) the exploration section 
dealing with locating and proving a deposit, (ii) the mine development section dealing 
with the construction of a mine to access a proven reserve,(iii) the production section 
dealing with the extraction the mineral from the ore body and processing the ore and 
refining and, (iv) beneficiation section concerned with the production of pure gold 
bars, coins, medals, jewellery,  electronics and dental industries.  Generally firms 
commonly referred to as mining firms6 participate directly or indirectly in the first two 
sub-chains exploration and production (mining). 
The Tanzanian gold mining value chain excludes the refining and beneficiation sub-
chain (Figure 2). There are no beneficiation firms in Tanzania. Output from the 
country‟s gold mining sector is refined and beneficiated in South Africa, Japan and 
Switzerland. 
In the figure all the shaded linkages are entirely resident in Tanzania and those not 
shaded are largely resident out of Tanzania with only small components resident in 
Tanzania. The details of the local activities are given below. 
                                                          
5
 See- http://www.mbendi.com/indy/ming/p0010.htm (Accessed  10 November 2009) 
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Figure 2: The Tanzanian gold mining value chain 
Source: This figure is based on interviews with mining and exploration firms in 
Tanzania (Interviews 2010) and MBendi Information services. 
 
3.2 Gold in Tanzania 
 
The gold mining industry of Tanzania is a multi-billion dollar industry in which various 
participants contribute machinery, materials and/or services in each linkage.  
 
In recent years the gold mining industry has a played crucial role in the economy of 
Tanzania. Gold has emerged as the country‟s leading foreign exchange earner with 
Saudi Arabia buying 99% of the country‟s gold output. Earnings from gold exports 
have grown from negligible levels to a level where in 2009 gold accounted for 20% of 
the country‟s US$4 billion export earnings as indicated in Figure 3.  
 
In addition to earning foreign exchange the industries also contributes to government 
revenues through paying royalties and other taxes such as pay as you earn (PAYE), 
corporation tax, employment levies, stamp duties export and import duties amongst 
others from mining firms and firms supplying goods and services to these firms. In 
addition the gold mining industry has provided direct employment to the citizens of 
Tanzania. As at December 2008, Tanzanian citizens made up 89% of the direct total 





















Figure 3: Exports of gold ($m) and gold as a share of total exports (%) 
Source: World Economic Indicators (2010) 
 
Three foreign multinational firms dominate large-scale gold production in the country. 
First there is African Barrick Gold (ABG) which operates four mines Bulyanhulu Gold 
Mine, Tulawaka Gold Mine, North Mara Gold Mine and Buzwagi Mine. Second there 
AngloGold Ashanti a firm formed by a merger of Ashanti Gold Fields Company 
(AGFC) of Ghana and AngloGold of South Africa owns and operates the Geita Gold 
Mine (GGM) and third there is Resolute Tanzania Limited (RTL) which is owned by 
Resolute Limited of Australia. RTL owns and operates the Golden Pride Mine. 
 
Access to the country‟s mineral resources is governed by terms in the Mining Act, 
19987.  The Act which is premised on the Mineral Policy, 1997, replaced the 1979 Act 
effectively ending the exclusive state access to the country‟s mineral wealth as part 
of wider economic reforms (SID, 2009). The Act opened the industry to local and 
private sector players but also made provisions that allow for the co-existence of 
local and foreign players. One of the major features of the Act is the distinction it 
makes between firms wholly owned by citizens of Tanzanian and firms with foreign 
shareholding. Division D of the Act specifies provisions for Tanzanian citizens or 
firms owned exclusively [emphasis added] by Tanzanian citizens in accessing 
mining rights. The Act exclusively grants primary licences such as Primary 
Prospecting Licences (PPL) and Primary Mining Licences (PML) to this group. A 
provision in Division D of the act makes no gradation on the extent of local 
ownership. A one percent foreign ownership excludes players from applying for 
primary licences. The regulations are unusual in this regard. Indications are that the 
majority of countries that favour local ownership of projects recognise varying 
degrees of local equity. For instance Zimbabwe, a country considered to have 
adopted extreme measures to give its citizens equity in mining ventures is targeting a 
51% stake for its citizen in projects worth more than $500000 (Sunday Times, 2011).  
Firms with foreign shareholding have access to four types of mineral rights: (i) 
prospecting licence, (ii) prospecting licence reconnaissance, (iii) mining licences and, 
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 This research was carried out when Tanzania was working on amending both the mineral Acts and 
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(iv) Special Mining Licences (SML), as specified in Divisions A and B supported by 
provisions in Division C. These players largely comprise of large-scale multinational. 
The major difference provision in Divisions A and D is that Division A provisions call 
for proof of both technical and financial capacity and capabilities to carry out the 
specific licence terms. Provisions in Division D do not make similarly demands thus 
lowering the entry barriers to local firms. To facilitate joint operations between local 
players and MNCs the Act allows for the conversion of primary licences into licences 
specified under Division A. For instance, a primary mining licence can be converted 
into a Mining Licence or Special Mining Licence (SML) if its holder enters into a joint 
venture with a foreign firm.  
 
Most important and controversially, Section 10 of the Act has provisions that allow 
the Minister of Minerals and Energy to negotiate and give special SML holders 
preferences such as tax exemptions and environmental impact assessment 
exemptions privately and without being restricted by other legal requirements. These 
agreements called mining development agreements (MDAs) without being restricted 
by other legal requirements are aimed at ensuring the fiscal stability of a long-term 
mining projects. An MDA is negotiated and granted in addition to other incentives 
such as depreciation allowances of 100 per cent, repatriation of capital and profit 
directly related to mining, non-mandatory government participation and exemption of 
import duty and Value Added tax (VAT) on equipment and essential materials up to 
the anniversary of start of production that the Act specifies.  
 
4.0 Research questions and methodology 
 
Large-scale gold mining in Tanzania has grown at a rate of about one new mine 
every two years since 1998. The most recent, Buzwagi Mine began production in late 
2009. This growth rate indicates confidence that mining firms have in the country. For 
goods and services suppliers the growth of the sector has seen an expanding 
potential market for their supplies. However concerns have been raised that the 
sector in operating as an enclave.  For the local economy the major question has 
been how to develop sustainable linkages in the sector and displace some of the 
imported goods and services. For the local economy to integrate into the sector the 
study sought to identify the factors that determine integrating into the country‟s gold 
mining sector asking the question: 
 
What is the nature and determinants of linkages in the gold mining 
sector in Tanzania? 
 
4.1 Scope of study 
 
Restricted to the exploration and the production sections of the value chain the study 
was carried out as a case study. Robert Yin (2009) provides a technical definition of 
a case study inquiry as having the following components; (i) copes with the 
technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest 
than data points, (ii) relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to 
converge in a triangulation fashion, and (iii) benefits from the prior development of 
theoretical proposition to guide data collection and analysis. 
 
The mine construction section was excluded because informants declined to inform 
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the study. In addition the section is a transitory linkage only available in the country 
when there is mine under construction. It is a domain of a few global firms that only 
take residence in a country to fulfil a contract. The refining and beneficiation linkages 
are also not resident in Tanzania. Access to other refineries outside South Africa was 
constrained by travelling and time limits on the study.  
 
Guided by the Making The Most Of Commodities  Programme (MMCP, see-
http://commodities.open.ac.uk)  hypotheses that the nature and extent of linkages is 
a function of  six explanatory issues namely; (i) ownership, (ii) infrastructure, (iii) the 
national systems of innovation (NSI), (iv) skills spill over, (v) impact of  regional 
economies and (iv) policy,  the study posed the following sub-questions; 
 
(i) What is extent and what are the determinants of local linkages in the 
exploration and production linkages of gold mining value chain in Tanzania? 
(ii) What role does ownership in general, and the derived organisation of the 
„Purchasing Function‟ in particular, play in determining linkages in the 
Tanzanian gold mining industry? 
(iii) What is the impact of physical infrastructure on the role that the local economy 
plays in the country‟s gold mining industry? 
(iv) What roles does the Tanzanian NSI play on increasing local linkages in the 
country‟s gold mining industry?  
(v) What is the impact of skills availability on local linkages and what is the 
spillover effect of skills transfer from the gold mining industry on other 
productive sectors of the economy? 
(vi) What roles do firms in the East African Community (EAC) and Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) countries play in the Tanzanian gold 
mining value chain? 
(vii)  How does institutional support and policy facilitate or constrain the 
participation of local the economy in developing linkages? 
 
4.2 Data collection and sample 
 
The depth and extent of pursuing these seven issues to address the main question 
was determined by two factors; access to informants and the time limits to conduct 
the research of the research.  As a result the study was restricted Tanzania the case 
study country, the location of gold mines of interest and to South Africa, a regional 
mining hub with head offices of critical mining firms‟ staff, mining goods manufactures 
and mining services providers.  
 
The main informants of the study were in three groups; (i) the mining and exploration 
firms, (ii) the goods and services providers and (iii) the Government of Tanzania 
(GoT) targeting three ministries; the MEM, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and 
Marketing (MTIM) and the Ministry of Infrastructure Development (MID). The 
selection of the government ministry was based on their relevance to developing 
linkages in the sector. Table 3 gives the population of description respondents 





Table 3: Population description and respondents  
Respondent Population Accessed Interviewed 
Mine 3 3 7 
Explorer Undefined 3 4 
Suppliers Undefined 8 12 
Government 3 targeted 3 5 
Government 
Agencies 
6 targeted 3 3 
Other --- 3 6 
Total --- 23 37 
 
The study gathered both qualitative and quantitative data through interviews and 
direct observations and document reviews for triangulation (Druckman, 2005 and 
Silverman, 2006). 
 
4.3 Research Challenges 
 
Field research faced three major challenges: 
 
(i) Politics and mining 
 
Primary data was gathered at the peak of debate on the amendment of the Mining 
Act, 1998 (United Republic of Tanzania [URT], 1998) and the Mineral Policy, of 
Tanzania, 1997 (URT 1997). During this period the gold mining industry was under 
media spotlight because of record high gold prices. The local media repeatedly 
mentioned these historical prices (some print media publications are in the local 
language Swahili) giving the impression that the large-scale mining firms were 
making super profits in the context wide spread poverty in the country. Heightened 
media spotlight on the sector resulted in guarded comments by both private and 
public sector informants who were particularly reluctant to provide numerical data. In 
some cases targeted informants declined to be interviewed. In addition some data 
could not be accessed as some critical mining related data are protected by law.  
 
(ii) Denied Access 
 
A number of targeted private sector firms declined to be interviewed. This was 
prevalent amongst exploration drilling firms and engineering firms servicing the 
sector. At the time of gathering primary data Barrick Gold Corporation was 
undergoing restructuring which gave birth to African Barrick Gold (ABG). The 
exercise led to redundancies which included a key contact established before 
travelling to Tanzania. This sudden change adversely limited access to ABG as 
alternative contacts frequently travelled out of Tanzania as part of restructuring 
briefings in South Africa. During this transition period access to ABG mines was 
denied with the firm gate-keepers reporting that they were restructuring and did not 
have all key personnel in place to accurately respond to the inquiry. 
 
(iii) Locating key informants 
 
In some cases targeted informants could not be located as they were highly mobile 
and some were not available even after confirmed appointments. This was very 
common amongst junior exploration firms. A number of these firms were not resident 
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at their registered addresses. Furthermore in cases where firms were located, access 
was limited because respondents were often not available in the offices and when 
located in exploration sites were reluctant to give interviews.  
 
Communication with targeted respondents was made difficult by poor telephone and 
internet services. Targeted interviewees also frequently switched between the two 
communication means. For instance a promised telephone response at times would 
be confirmed through the e-mail resulting in missed appointments when the internet 
service was interrupted and messages could not be accessed.  
 
5.0 Linkages in the mining sector 
 
A typical mineral value chain consists of a series of stages that starts with exploration 
and ends at the production of a finished product. Each stage in the chain is designed 
to increase the grade and economic value of the valuable components of the original 
ore. A variety of different capital goods, spares, consumables and services are 
required at each stage to ensure and maintain operational efficiency and productivity. 
Collectively, the firms that provide these inputs are termed the „„inputs cluster‟‟ 
(Walker and Minnitt, 2006). The inputs cluster can be described in terms of four 
principal sets of linkages or socio-economic stimuli, which after Albert Hirschman 
cited in Auty (2006) are: (i) backward linkages (the establishment of firms to provide 
inputs to the export commodity); (ii) forward linkages (the establishment of firms to 
process the commodity prior to its export);(iii)fiscal linkage (the spending of 
government taxes levied on the commodity) and, (iv) final demand linkages (the 
activities set up in response to the local spending of wages and profits by labour and 
the owners of capital). 
 
Focusing on the determinants of linkages in the mineral sector, this section proceeds 
by giving a synopsis of the determinants of linkages in the global gold mining value 
chain and also partly reviews the same determinants in Tanzania. 
 
5.1 Global linkages and determinants of linkages. 
 
A mine can only exist in a location where there is a mineral deposit.  Geological 
related mineral deposits often exist in clusters of similar deposits in a locality leading 
to observed phenomenon of mining regions when these deposits are exploited. 
Example of mining regions include the copper belt in Zambia, the gold green stone 
belt in Tanzania, Johannesburg (the Rand) in South Africa famous for its gold and 
diamonds and iron-ore mining  Kiruna region of  northern Sweden (Eggert, 2001). 
Analysis of the history of mining regions indicates that the mere existence of an 
economically exploitable deposit is not sufficient reason to exploit a deposit. Work by 
Isard et al. (1998); Krugman (1991) and Eggert (2001) amongst others indicate that 
the location of a business venture such as mining is a function of the available 
infrastructure (roads, water and electricity), agglomeration economies (the input 
industry) and government (central, regional and local government) policy. Mining 
firms evaluate the viability of exploiting proven reserves by considering ex ante these 
and other factors. Beginning with costs, mines thus must consider the upfront cost of 
exploration or buying a proven exploitable reserve from a junior explorer and the 
upfront cost of mine design and construction, the purchase of capital equipment 
(CAPEX); operational costs (maintenance and consumable etc.), development of 
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new reserves and the cost of closure. In addition to these exploration and mining 
firms consider the cost of accessing goods and services necessary for their 
operations. In some economies the demand for goods and services spur the 
development of industry to supply the goods and services directly to the mining 
sector (Eggert, 2001).  Where successful and sustainable, these industries may have 
positive multiplier effects and spillovers leading the development of other industries 
and capabilities. But these costs need to be balanced against the sale of the final 
product. For the mine to be a profitable venture, it is not just the sale and the price of 
the product which is important, but also how long it will take for the mine to become 
productive. A long gestation period may involve such high borrowing costs that it 
outweighs the value of the final sale of the output, even though a high price may 
seem attractive to a casual observer (and sometime to a policymaker too!). 
 
One of the examples of documented development outcomes that were mineral driven 
is the economic development of the Western Australia and the state of Victoria also 
in Australia. Researchers argue that the two states owe part of their economic 
development outcome to the gold mining activities in the states. The two states have 
developed mining backward and forward linkages and boosted the development of 
other industries such as communication, manufacturing, transport and agriculture 
(Eggert, 2001). Drawing on the experience of Australia and South African where the 
clustering and development of backward linkages rode the wave of gold mining 
booms, it is evident that a significant determinant of developing linkages is a stable 
level of demand for goods and services (Walker, 2005). Porter (1990) also argues 
that international demand coupled with a demanding local customer base, can 
provide the foundation upon which a competitive supplier base is established. The 
basis of the argument is that demand is shaped by developments at both the 
international and national level. Most importantly the sustainable backward linkages 
developed by these countries were not generally based on the import substitution 
industrialization policies which often relied on rigid protection mechanisms such as 
guaranteed quotas, exchange controls and overvalued exchange rates (Eggert, 
2001). The linkages were based on sustainability and competitiveness in an open 
market. Governments often played a role in developing local linkages through 
developing local capacities and capabilities including encouraging local purchases. 
For instance in Norway the state-owned company Statoil Oil Company founded in 
1972, played a crucial role in transforming parts of Norwegian manufacturing industry 
into  an engineering industry with specialist skills in the production of deep-sea oil 
drilling equipment, platforms, pipelines and supply ships (Cappelen and Mjøset, 
2009). 
 
Experience from countries that have successfully developed sustainable linkages 
and spillovers in the resource sector shows two other determinants; systems of 
innovation measured by absorptive capacities, learning, technology transfer and 
diffusion, and industrial policy. For instance Wright and Czelusta (2002), point out 
that in the USA the mineral sector was an integral part of the broader process of 
national development. They point out that the rise of the American minerals economy 
was also determined by the country‟s investment in the infrastructure of public 
knowledge and specifically education in mining, minerals, and metallurgy in an 
accommodating legal environment. In South Africa the isolation of the country prior to 
independence in 1994 and the need to deal with deep gold deposits led to the 
development of distinct and appropriate cooling and drilling technologies. A major 
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determinant of this development like in the case of the USA was research and 
development led by the research arm of the Chamber of Mines, COMRO (Lorentzen, 
2005).  
 
However, the majority of research has focused on macro determinants of developing 
linkages. Literature on the micro determinants on developing linkages is very thin. 
Literature that has attempted to do this instead indicates growth of local linkages but 
does not discuss the firm-level determinants of these linkages in depth. For instance 
Aragòn and Rud (2009) discussing the impact of the Yanacocha gold mine in Peru 
point-out the increasing level of local participation in the mine‟s supplies as driven by 
a change in mine‟s purchasing policy but do not mention the micro issues that 
determine who amongst the local is selected as a supplier of  tangibles and services 
and why. They however do mention that the supplied services have to meet the 
mining firm‟s standards which they do not discuss. 
 
In Tanzania research to date indicates the mining sector has not triggered any 
significant growth in the local economy, partly because large-scale mining operations 
are generally detached from local supply chains (Kweka, 2009). The mining firms 
however argue otherwise, stating that where capacity and capability are available, 
they do utilise local linkages. In a response to a report titled „A Golden Opportunity? 
How Tanzania is failing to benefit from gold mining‟ (Curtis and Lissu, 2008), the 
mining firms refuted the authors‟ claims of the industry not purchasing local service 
and tangibles where available. In the report ABG claims that in 2005 „at least 55 per 
cent‟ of its procurement was done locally (Tanzania as a whole). In same report the 
former Chief Executive of Geita Gold Mine, Peter Turner is quoted stating that in 
2006 that GGM spent 46 per cent of its annual budget on local supplies and 54 per 
cent on foreign supplies. Neither of these responses however open up the extent of 
domestic value added in these local purchases. 
 
This work is an attempt to document the nature, extent and determinants of the said 
linkages by focusing on a combination of macro- and especially micro-level decisions 
which affect the nature and extent of linkages into the Tanzanian gold mining sector. 
 
5.2 The nature and extent of linkages 
 
Integration into the gold mining value chain can be a lucrative and sustainable 
economic activity that is subject to basic economic principles, which measure 
economic success in terms of revenues and related expenditures.  
 
This section examines in detail the nature, extent and determinants of linkages in the 
two sub-sections of the gold mining value chain in Tanzania. The first section 
examines the exploration sub-section; the second section focuses on the production 




Exploration is a risky and lengthy process that comprises various activities and inputs 
from different specialized actors working and focused on ensuring a positive outcome 
within an economic time frame.  
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Exploration is a sequential process that generally involves two activities; gathering 
data and thereafter analyzing and evaluating the data. Proceeding between stages is 
governed by stage-gates that ensure the process only proceeds if evaluations and 
analysis show typical indications of a deposit.  The stage-gates are very critical as 
they minimize the risk of pursuing projects that will not yield positive outcomes of a 
viable deposit.  
 
Figure 4 represents the gold exploration value chain in Tanzania. The exploration 
linkages reside both inside (shaded) and outside (not shaded) Tanzania. Exploration 
is divided into two stages; early stage exploration and late stage exploration. The 
process gathers two types of data; (i) geochemical data which involves collecting 
samples and analyzing soil, rocks and segments from the surface and drill holes at 
different depths and (ii) geophysical data which comprises of data on variations in 
gravity, magnetism, electromagnetism (resistivity of rocks) and  other variables in a 
certain area. Geophysical data is gathered both from the ground and airborne using 
appropriately equipped aeroplanes. The gathered data is analyzed and interpreted to 
inform the likelihood and quality of a deposit in the area of concern. 
 
 
Figure 4: The Tanzanian Gold Exploration Value Chain 
Source: This figure is based on interviews with an exploration firm and exploration 
departments of mining firms (Interviews 2009) and Mbendi, 2009. 
Gold exploration in Tanzania is anchored by the government and the private sector. 
The two anchors have two distinct roles.  First, the government‟s role is to regulate 
the industry by granting appropriate exploration licences, collecting the relevant fees 
and revenues. Most importantly, the government through its executive agency the 
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Geological Survey of Tanzania (GST) 8 is the source of geological data that initiate 
exploration.  
 
Second, there is the private sector which buys the geological data and carries out 
exploration projects. Private sector players comprise junior explorers, intermediate 
explorers and major explorers, the mining houses with Greenfield exploration 
capacity. The Mining Act of Tanzania, 1998 changed the exploration scene in 
Tanzania by allowing both domestic and foreign private enterprises to compete with 
the two previously exclusive players the National Development Corporation (NDC) 
and the State Mining Company (STAMICO) both State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
(Nord et al, 2006 and SID, 2009).  
 
Table 4 shows a sample of junior explorers and intermediate active in Tanzania‟s 
gold exploration efforts.  
 
Table 4: Identified gold exploration firms active in Tanzania. 
Firm Headquarters Ownership 
structure (shares) 




Canada 0 100 Junior explorer Magambazi 
Zari 
Exploration 
Tanzania Majority Minority Junior explorer Imweru and Lupa 
Curries Rose 
Resources 
Canada 0 100 Junior gold explorer Susi River and Mabele 
Hills 
Shanta Gold Guernsey 0 100 Gold exploration 
and development 






0 100 Gold and Nickel 
deposit exploration 
and development 
































Canada 0 100 Gold and base 
metal Exploration 
and development   
Ikungu, Isambara, 




Tanzania Majority Minority Junior explorer Not indicated 
Gold Finders Tanzania 100 0 Junior explorer Not indicated 
Tanzimex Tanzania 100 0 Junior explorer Kinyambwiga 
Source: This table was developed by the author based on interviews with exploration 
firms in Tanzania (Interviews 2010). 
The table clearly indicates domination of the industry by foreign firms. Amongst 
foreign junior exploration firms, Canadian firms dominate the industry followed by 
                                                          
8
 http://www.gst.go.tz/add/about_history.html (Accessed September 2010).  
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Australian firms. Tanzanian domicile firms like Tanzimex Exploration, Gold Finders 
and Zari Exploration have made inroads into the sector.  
The sample in Table 4 exhibits dominance of private sector firm. Participation in 
exploration is solely dependent on technical and financial capacities and capabilities. 
It is open to both foreign and domestic private sector enterprises. The share holding 
structure is the sole prerogative of the explorer but any degree of foreign share 
holding renders the explorer illegible to accessing primary exploration licences. The 
government has no stake in these enterprises but engages in exploration through the 
SOEs STAMICO and NDC. Liberal policies allowing free enterprise are not confined 
to explorers only but also apply to goods and services providers as given in Tables 
where these suppliers are discussed below (see- Tables 6, 7, 9 and 10). 
 
In addition to the junior explorers the three large-scale mining firms active in 
Tanzania have their own Greenfield exploration department or firms. For instance 
AngloGold Ashanti (AGA) has and exploration branch with head offices in 
Johannesburg, South Africa. Its exploration team in Tanzania comprises both 
Tanzanian citizens and expatriate staff as is the case with Resolute (Tanzania) 
Limited. ABG‟s exploration interests are handled by Barrick Exploration Africa Limited 
(BEAL), a wholly owned subsidiary of Barrick Gold Corporation, also active in 
Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea 
 
Explorers stated that they retained certain linkages in-house and contracted out 
others. Activities are either contracted out or retain in-house as shown in Table 5 
where X denotes an activity retained and 0 an activity is outsourced. 
 
Table 5: Outsourced and in-house activities in the Tanzanian gold exploration 
value chain 
Service/Process In-house Outsourced 
Target generation X 0 
area selection X 0 
Geophysical work  0 X 
Laboratory work 0 X 
QAQC X 0 
Drawing up contracts X 0 
Reserve estimation X 0 
Logistics 0 X 
Data capture and processing X 0 
Drilling  0 X 
Source: This table is based on interviews with exploration firms in Tanzania 
(Interviews 2010). 
 
The explorers stated that they generally contracted out the physical aspects of 
exploration such as geophysical and geochemical work like drilling, airborne 
geophysical surveys, laboratory analysis and the logistic works like camp 
management. They however retained the quality management function of these 




5.3.1 Geochemical works  
 
Geochemical work involves collecting and analyzing samples. Soil, sediments and 
rocks samples are collected from the surface and underground. Obtaining 
underground samples involves drilling, a key and most expensive component of 
mineral exploration activities. An exploration manager of a mining firm confirmed the 
prominence of drilling in exploration stating;  
 
“..I can say 90% of the exploration cost is going into drilling. If you have US$8 
million budget you be expecting more than US$7 million to go into drilling 
because it is very costly.” (Interview, February 2010). 
 
Drilling intensity varies across the exploration stages. Generally most drilling takes 
place during the late stage exploration phase processes of ore-body delineation. 
Table 6 identifies the gold exploration goods and services providers supporting 
exploration geochemical works in Tanzania. The Table clearly show the dominance 
of drilling works suppliers. 
 
Table 4: Exploration geochemical works good and services providers in 
Tanzania 
Firm Head Office Service scope Ownership structure (shares) 
Local Foreign Public Private 
GST Tanzania Geological mapping, geophysical and 
geophysical surveys and analysis 
100 0 100 0 
STAMICO Tanzania Drilling (scope and range not 
ascertained), mineral exploration and 
property consultancy and Joint 
Venturing 
100 0 100 0 
Tan Zoz Tanzania Drilling (scope not ascertained) Majority Minority 0 100 
Gold Finders Tanzania Stream sediment, soil and rock chip 
sampling 
100 0 0 100 
Capital 
Drilling 
Singapore Surface diamond core, high air 
capacity, reverse circular, grade 
control, heli-portable diamond, deep 
directional core orientation, air core, 
geotechnical, coal and coal-bed 
methane drilling services. 






Services)   
Australia Rotary air blast (RBA), kit bit, reverse 
circulation, diamond, directional and 
grade control drilling services. 





Australia Reverse circulation, surface diamond, 
directional, RBA and air core drilling 
services 
0 100 0 100 
Major Drilling Canada Surface and underground coring, 
directional, reverse circulation, 
geotechnical coal and coal-bed 
methane drilling services 
0 100 0 100 
SEAMIC Tanzania Geological mapping, geochemical and 
geophysical surveys and analysis 
100 0 100 0 
ALX Chemex Australia Sample preparation and analysis 0 100 0 100 
SGS 
Laboratories 
Italy Sample preparation, analysis and 
turnkey surveys 
0 100 0 100 




The geochemical works supplies market has also seen changes since the Mining 
Act, 1998 allowed both local and foreign actors in the scene. Prior to the Act, the 
State Mining Company (STAMICO) was the sole player. After the Act was enacted, 
foreign players such as Layne Drilling established operations in Tanzania. In addition 
locally domicile drilling firms such as Tan-Zorro Drilling have been established. 
 
The personnel carrying out drilling operations comprises both Tanzanian citizens and 
expatriates. In the absence of detailed data responses from the drilling firms, the 
study could not ascertain the distribution of skilled, unskilled local and expatriate 
employees in the drilling firms. Despite the absence of detailed responses, an 
exploration manager pointed out that the machine operators were largely Tanzanian 
citizens trained abroad during the Nyerere era. He further stated that in his 
experience, the operators were capable as they had and both practical and 
theoretical drilling knowledge but had not had an opportunity to practice with their 
previous employer STAMICO. The manager remarked; 
 
„I can tell you they [Tanzanian drillers] were second to none,… because unlike 
the foreign drillers which I think did not go to any specific form of training, 
these people[Tanzanian drillers]  in the past the government sent them abroad 
to learn drilling techniques.[meaning they were formally trained abroad]‟ 
(Interview , February, 2010). 
 
All drilling equipment and components used in Tanzania are imported with no local 
value addition. The maintenance of the machinery is effectively a closed system with 
the drilling firms dealing directly with machinery and spare manufactures. Two firms 
with worldwide operations supplying drilling machinery and spares Atlas Copco and 
Sandvik Mining and Construction both of Sweden have established subsidiaries in 
Tanzania to service players in the field.  
 
In addition to the drilling geochemical works Tanzania also host laboratories that 
carry out geochemical assays and also prepare samples for advanced geochemical 
assays not available locally. Tanzania hosts both private sector and public sector 
geochemical laboratories. The public sector laboratories (the GST laboratory) 
engage in sample preparation and a limited range of assaying techniques. The GST 
laboratory is manned entirely by citizens of Tanzanian and serves its own internal 
needs of assaying to provide geochemical maps as well as assaying on contract for 
private sector explorers. In addition there is the Southern and Eastern African Mineral 
Centre (SEAMIC) laboratory also offering more or less the same services. Economic 
liberalization resulted in two foreign owned private laboratories; ALX Chemex and 
SGS laboratories establishing operations in Tanzania. The laboratories carry out 
sample preparation in Tanzania but send the samples to South Africa and Australia 
for analysis. Access to the laboratories was however denied.  
 
The study identified an emerging industry of sample container9 producers. For 
geochemical work sample containers are critical for carrying samples from the 
exploration sites to the laboratories. The containers have to be made of inert and 
durable material that will not react with the samples. In addition the containers have 
to be durable and not tear and mix samples in transit.  Exploration sampling uses a 
                                                          
9
 Containers to carry rock and soil samples 
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lot of containers to store sample for laboratory analysis. One firm reported collecting 
7 500 samples from one of its more than 30 exploration licensed sites. Currently 
most containers are imported from South Africa and Australia with local suppliers 
having only recently entered the stage. Explorers expressed willingness to purchase 
locally fabricated containers as long as they met the required stands. 
 
5.3.2 Geophysical works 
 
Whereas the geochemical linkages indicated a number of local linkages the 
circumstances in the geophysical linkages indicate very limited local linkages. Table 
7 lists firms identified as providers of exploration geophysical work services.  
 
Table 5: Geophysical work service providers active in Tanzania 





South Africa Airborne geophysical 
surveys 
0 100 
Geophysics GPR Zimbabwe Ground based geophysical 
surveys 
0 100 
Geoimage Australia Satellite imagery and geo-
spatial solution provider 





Australia Geological mapping 0 100 
UTS Geophusyics Australia Airborne magnetic surveys 0 100 
Gold Finders  Tanzania Ground magnetometer 
surveys 
100 0 
Source: This table is based on interviews with exploration stakeholders in Tanzania 
(Interviews 2010)  
 
The suppliers listed in Table 7 are all foreign except for Gold Finders a local explorer 
with limited ground based geophysical work capacity and capabilities. However none 
of the exploration majors and juniors mentioned using the firm‟s capacity and 
capabilities in their own work. Geophysical services providers were largely available 
from firms of Australian origin complemented by skills and service from South Africa, 
a regional mining power-house. In addition Zimbabwe, a country with a fairly 
developed mining expertise base that has been affected by political and economic 
unrest was mentioned as a source of ground geophysical work services. Geophysical 
works service providers were not available to inform the study. Foreign firms 
providing geophysical services to both the public and private sector exploration sub-
chain imported in all equipment and spares for their work. The equipment and spare 
comprises electronic equipment such as cameras not manufactured in Tanzania. 
 
The GST, a public sector enterprise calls on different sources of service providers for 
its geophysical work. The Acting Commissioner of Minerals in the MEM stated that in 
the 2003 to 2007 upgrade of geophysical data the GST received technical assistance 
from agencies such as Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources 
(BGR) of Germany, the United Nations Development Programme, UNDP, and the 
Geological Survey of Finland (GTK) as a contractor assisting the GST10. The 
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agencies are said to have brought in technical expertise and equipment from their 
own countries to work with and train their Tanzanian counterparts. The suppliers of 
equipment and subcontractors (if any) used in this upgrading work were not made 
available.    
 
5.3.3 Other works 
 
Exploration occurs in areas where geological data indicates the likelihood of 
deposits. Often these areas are remote. Accessing and operating from exploration 
site is usually a logistically demanding exercise. To carry out exploration work, firms 
need to rapidly and cost effectively move both equipment and personnel to the 
selected site. Firms have emerged to offer such service leaving explorers to 
concentrate on their core competencies. The firms provide a number of services such 
as the clearing access to exploration sites, catering, facilitating the purchase or hire 
of appropriately equipped all-terrain vehicles, the supply and management of 
exploration camps. Three major firms; African Mineral Exploration Service, All Terrain 
Services (ATS) and Sodexho were identified as firms proving these services in 
Tanzania. African Mineral Exploration Services is a Kenyan registered firm with a 
management team of Australian origin. ATS is part of the Canadian Mineral 
Exploration and Company (CME & Company) group operating remote camp catering, 
hotels, bars and restaurants throughout Africa. ATS offers camp management 
services to exploration firms. Sodexho on the other hand is a camp management firm 
of French origin also offering camp management services, like catering and general 
housekeeping service like laundry.  
 
From 1998 to 2010 a small number of Tanzanian citizens have made attempts to 
establish similar operations offering logistics services such as all terrain vehicles and 
clearing access to selected exploration areas. The majority of local firms identified 
were unregistered „one-man‟ operations often reliant on recommendations from 
locals involved in one way or the other with the exploration the various exploration 
firms. Indications are that with increased exploration activities in Tanzania, demand 
for such services will grow providing an opportunity for Tanzanians to establish and 
register world class firms in the field. 
 
5.4 Determinant of linkages; explorers’ views 
 
Explorers emphasized that exploration was a very risky undertaking with a one in a 
thousand chance of a  Greenfield project proceeding from  pure desk work such as 
target selection to prospecting at the early stage exploration phase to the preparation 
of a bankable feasibility study (BFS) at the end of late stage exploration phase. 
Spencer (Interview, 2010) summarized the increasing odds of a success in a 





Figure 5: The inverted exploration triangle. 
Source: Prepared by author from interviews 2010. 
 
The figure indicates that a Greenfield project even at the final BFS stage still only has 
a 10 percent chance of developing into a profitable mine and that a project at initial 
late stage exploration phase (drilling for ore body delineation) has a one in five 
hundred chance of being a mine. To mitigate risk explorers subject progress on 
exploration projects to numerous stage-gates to designed control both internal and 
external variables. 
 
Internally all the respondents mentioned that competent and experienced personnel 
were critical in ensuring favourable exploration outcomes. They acknowledged that 
experience came from practice stating that they had specific internal training 
programmes designed to give experience to newly recruited Tanzanian citizen 
graduates from the universities and colleges at home and abroad. 
 
The responding explorers stated that they had set criteria to measure goods and 
services suppliers. To ensure transparency, the explorers stated that large purchases 
were subject to tender process and smaller purchases to comparison of a minimum 
of three quotations. The respondents were asked to identify, define and rank critical 
success factors (CFS) or order winning‟ characteristics‟ (Hill, 2000:39). The 
respondents mentioned six common CFS as follows; (i) Safety Policy, defined as 
the documented and procedural steps taken to minimize occupational risks; (ii) 
Track-record, defined as a traceable history in supplying specific products and 
services. An exploration manager emphasized the point of a good track record in 
Tanzania stating; 
„…we are looking for [we look for] a stable company that already has a foot-
hold into [in] Tanzania…‟ (Interview, February 2010).                                                          
(iii)Back-up, defined as the ability to guarantee goods and services in cases of 
failure of stated goods and services to meet expectations; (iv) Skills/capability, 
defined as the ability to timely and correctly deliver the required goods and services; 
(v) Financial stability, defined as the ability of a supplier to fund its supplies without 
resorting to advance payment, and (v) Cost/price, defined as the total cost 
[emphasis added] of purchasing goods and services. The emphasis on total cost 
arises from the nature of drilling services charge that drilling firms. Some service 
provider firms‟ charges are inclusive of operating costs such as fuel, lubricants and 
security of personnel and equipment costs whereas others are not. Therefore 
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adjudicating cost implications of outsourcing a service involves examining and 
quantifying the total costs of paying the service provider, including the cost the 
explorer has to bear in executing that contract.  
 
Explorers were asked to rank these CSF on a scale of one to seven where one was 
the score of least importance and seven as score of highest importance. The sole 
responding junior explorer could not be drawn to rank the CSF stating that it was 
inappropriate to rank them as none of the CSFs were independent enough to be 
ranked individually. Results from the two responding exploration majors are 
summarized graphically in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: CFS ranking: Explorer’s views 
Source: This figure is based on interviews with exploration stakeholders (Interviews 
2010) 
The figure indicates that the cost of sourcing goods and services with an average 
score of two points was the lowest ranked CSF. The safety policy was considered the 
key CSF by both explorers scoring the highest score of seven points. The rest of the 
CSF scored four to five points.  Comparable scores from goods and service providers 
were not available. Access to the group was denied and where access was granted 
the location of key informants was not possible as the majority of providers of foreign 
origin tend to have only operators and technical people in Tanzania. This group could 
not provide comparable data and were reluctant to inform the study without 
authorization from their regional and corporate offices. 
5.4.1 Classification of Purchases 
The skills, processes, services and equipment used in the exploration process vary in 
many dimensions. The study sought to define these parameters (skills, processes, 
services and equipment) in two dimensions; complexity and criticality from both the 
buyers and suppliers view points. Consequently the respondents were asked to rank 
these in a two-by-two matrix as either lowly or highly critical and as either lowly or 

















•Target generation, area selection
•Geophysical work at prospecting
•Logistics 
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Figure 7: Classification of exploration services and tasks 
Source: This figure is based on interviews with exploration stakeholders (Interviews 
2010). 
 
Explorers stated that they could not classify the equipment and machinery used in 
exploration work because that was beyond their scope. They advanced a view that 
something they may regard as complex may be viewed as simple from a suppliers 
view point. However, they classified the various exploration services and activities as 
follows;    
 
(i) Target generation and area selection11 were perceived as highly complex and 
highly critical activities. Inadequacies at target generation and area selection are 
potentially costly in two aspects.  
(ii)  
First pursuing exploration on barren ground leads to wasted efforts and money 
without realizing a productive mine to recover the exploration costs. Second, missing 
vital geological indicators of a viable deposit may lead to a mine development 
opportunity that can be seized by more competent explorers. For instance the 
Buzwagi Mine in Tanzania is regarded to be ABG‟s most profitable mine, despite 
numerous major and junior explorers misinterpreting the geological indicators of gold 
in the area. An exploration manager (then a junior employee in one the firms) who 
initially saw potential in the site commented;  
„At Company XYZ [junior exploration firm‟s name withheld] I supervised that 
project. Before I went there, five foreign companies who had worked there 
[reconnaissance for area selection] … They decided to leave because they 
believed there was nothing.‟ (Interview, February 2010). 
                                                          
11
 Target generation is the process of identifying countries or regions whose geology indicates the 
likelihood of deposits and area selection is the  narrowing down the search minerals  from target 
identification to a specific area in a country 
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The same manager recommended the site to his superiors who however rejected the 
project. Persistence by the manager and similar views from an external consultant 
resulted in further exploration work that confirmed viable deposits. The manager 
further remarked; 
„Even when I was working for company X [major firm name withheld] … my 
manager did not accept that this was good ground. I had to defend it and I got 
back up from one company X‟s consultant Professor P. from one University in 
Canada because he is much respected and then they accepted this.‟ 
(Interview, February 2010). 
 
Explorers understand the difficulty of target identification and area selection. The 
firms mitigate this by calling on external expertise. Another example of external 
influence is illustrated in how Dr. Peter Grove influenced Canaco (an exploration firm 
active in Tanzania) to purchase the licences for the Magambazi area (Mining News 
and Journal, 2010). 
 
(iii) The respondents placed laboratory work, quality assurance/quality control 
(QAQC), drilling, sampling, drawing up contracts and reserve estimation in the low 
complexity and high criticality quadrant (bottom right quadrant).  
 
Laboratory work, QAQC, drilling and sampling were mentioned as interlinked 
parameters. QAQC first ensures that drilling and sampling follow laid down 
procedures that do not lead to false results. False results affect mine design and ore 
processing techniques choices. As a result firms ensure robust QAQC systems at 
drilling; sampling and analysis to identify minimize and eliminate errors. Implementing 
these systems was reported as being a low complex but highly critical process that 
minimizes the likelihood of false results and interpretations. The calculation of 
reserves was placed in this quadrant because it is said to follow “laid down 
procedures” but is highly critical as it defines how a mineral site will be rated by 
developers.  
 
(iv) Under the low complex and low critical quadrant explorers mentioned the 
provision of logistics such as the provision of transport for goods and personnel, 
vehicle maintenance, food supply (limited to what is available locally), professional 
services such as accounting, auditing and immigration services. Also in this quadrant 
were data capture and processing. This was classified as simple process because 
the firms believed that they had adequate quality management systems to deal with 
potential errors.  
(v)  
None of the respondents could instantly allocate a service or process to the low 
critical and high complex quadrant. Follow-ups to populate the quadrant were not 
successful with explorers stating that they did not view an exploration process or 
service as being lowly critical but highly complex. 
 
An inquiry of the source and origins of service providers corroborated the list of 
identified goods and services providers. The locations were classified as local, 
representing suppliers based in Tanzania, regional for suppliers based in the EAC 
and SADC and the international suppliers based outside Africa. Figure 8 below 
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shows a graphic representation the dominant12 geographical location of supplier in 
the relevant. 
INTERNATIONAL PURCHASES
LOCAL PURCHASES REGIONAL PURCHASES
Low  complexity
High Complexity
Low  criticality High criticality
 
Figure 8: Geographic location of suppliers 
Source: This figure is based on interviews with exploration stakeholders (Interviews 
2010) 
 
Generally the services in the high complex and high critical quadrant were sourced 
from international firms outside Africa (Figure 8). However South Africa a regional 
mining power house and host of a number international exploration services firms 
also had a stake in the supply. Regional powers such as South Africa generally 
dominate the low complexity but high critical quadrants. Some international firms 
such as drilling firms with locally registered operations have exposed locals to 
activities in this quadrant. Tanzania citizens provide labour as machine operators. 
 
The explorers stated that in some instances standards and local capacity and 
capabilities limited local linkages. For instance part of the laboratory work is carried 
out abroad as the local laboratories lacked adequate facilities for a full range assays. 
Also some laboratories are not accredited to regulatory bodies such as the Joint Ore 
Reserves Committee (JORC)13. The SEAMIC and GST laboratories for example are 
not accredited to JORC the major standard dominating the Tanzanian market. In 
addition the GST laboratory offers a limited range of both geophysical and 
geochemical analysis. These deficits limit deeper integration of the two laboratories 
in the exploration sub-chain. 
 
In general goods and services in the low complex and low criticality quadrants were 
sourced locally. International firms have established Tanzania registered operations 
to take advantage of these operations. For instance, at the time of the study they 
                                                          
12
 Figure 8 restricts the classification to the dominant suppliers in the relevant quadrant.  There are 
overlaps between the quadrants as supplier move around the locations responding to business 
demands. 
13
 The JORC Code provides minimum standards for public reporting to ensure that investors and their 
advisers have all the information they would reasonably require for forming a reliable opinion on the 
results and estimates being reported. 
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dominated the camp management services suppliers. These suppliers stated that 
their own local purchases were limited to food and beverages. However, they stated 
that they import branded foods and almost all manufactured equipment not 
manufactured in Tanzania.  
 
5.5 Production linkages 
 
The primary focus of the production value chain is the safe removal and semi- 
processing of the mineral resource for refining, beneficiation and sale to recover 
exploration and construction expenses and to fund the production running costs. 
 
The gold production value chain  (Figure 9) comprises four linkages; the drilling and 
blasting linkage, the loading and haulage linkage, the processing linkage that yields 
gold dorè (semi-processed ore) and finally the transport linkage that facilitates the 
movement of gold dorè to the gold refineries.  
 
Gold production, commonly known as mining is a highly sequential process with each 
linkage solely dependent on the one before it. For instance the loading and hauling 
process depends on the availability of rock and earth yielded by the drilling and 
blasting process and the operation of the processing plant also required the output of 
the loading and hauling of ore bearing rock and earth from the drilling and blasting 
activities. 
 
The anchors of the value chain are the mining houses ABG, AGA and Resolute 
Tanzania Limited (RTL). Between them the three mining firms own and operate the 
six large-scale gold mines that were operational in Tanzania at the time of this study. 
ABG owned four mines accounting for 60% large-scale production output. AGA 
owned one mine, GGM account for 30% of output and RTL accounting for the 10% 
balance of the large-scale output operated the Golden Pride Mine.  
 
The production process generally employs one of two strategies. First a mining firm 
may choose to be directly and solely involved in all of the sub- chain activities. 
Second and alternatively, a firm may choose to contract out some or all of the drilling 
and blasting, the loading and hauling and the transportation of gold dorè linkages 
retaining the gold ore processing linkage only. Usually firms prefer retaining the ore 
processing linkage in-house. In Tanzania one mining firm RTL has contracted out its 
drilling (or excavation), blasting, loading and hauling operations. The firm contracted 
these linkages to an international firm Caspian mining.  ABG indicated it had no 
preferred modus operandi in the in-sourcing or outsourcing of these linkages treating 
each mine on a case by case basis. The firm was however reluctant to discuss 





Figure 9: The production value chain 
Source: This figure was developed by the author based on interviews with 
exploration firms in Tanzania (Interviews 2010). 
 
Outside the supply of  drilling, blasting loading and hauling services, supplies to the 
production linkages generally fall into two groups; the supply of  machinery, spares 
and consumable used in drilling, blasting loading and hauling and, the supply of 
spares and consumables used in the processing plant.  
 
5.5.1 Drilling, blasting loading and hauling hardware supplies. 
 
In Tanzania the excavation, loading and hauling machinery market is largely a 
preserve of two original equipment manufacturer (OEM) firms Komatsu and 
Caterpillar.  
 
Caterpillar operates as Mantrac with local branches in Dar es Salaam, Mwanza, 
Tanga and Moshi. The firm offers a range of comprehensive repair and maintenance 
contracts to the mining sector and other sectors as well. The Mwanza workshop 
services the country‟s gold mining sectors. Komatsu operates as Pan African Mining 
Services Tanzania Limited running two maintenance and repair contracts with GGM 
and the ABG‟s Buzwagi mine.  At the GGM mine the Pan African Mining Services 
has a supply and service agreement for 56 machines. The firm also services the 
Buzwagi mine where it is the principal mining equipment supplier with maintenance 
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Mine (Barrick Gold), Tulawaka Gold Mine. In addition it counts Caspian Mining a 
Golden Pride Mine (Resolute Tanzania Limited) contract miner as a customer.  
 
Indications in Tanzania are that where mining firms opt to retain the drilling, blasting, 
loading and hauling function in-house, capital goods supply is almost entirely on 
supply and service contracts. The contracts usually last the lifespan of the mine. The 
respondents stated that the mining houses preferred such arrangements to mitigate 
the risk of technological failures and redundancies, and the overhead costs of 
maintaining the machinery in-house. An operations manager commented; 
„These supply and service contracts puts the pressure of making sure the 
machinery is well serviced and always available on the supplier.... even if the 
technology changes we are covered [suppliers are contractually bound to 
supply the correct components and spares all the time].‟ (Interview, March 
2010). 
 
Drilling machinery is largely supplied by Sandvik Mining and Construction of Sweden 
but with offices in Tanzania. There is virtually no local value addition in these 
supplies. The heavy drilling (or excavation), loading and hauling equipment and the 
processing plant demand a number of consumables. As a result consumable 
linkages have developed to fulfil this demand. 
 
5.5.2 Drilling, blasting loading and hauling consumables. 
 
Consumables in the drilling, blasting, loading and hauling linkages comprise 
petroleum fuel, lubricants, explosives and machinery wear and tear spares.  
 
Liquid petroleum fuel is a leading consumable in the two linkages. The fuel powers 
the drilling, loading and haulage machinery. The procurement managers in all the 
three mining firms stated that petroleum products were the most costly (financially) 
inputs of the production sub-chain. Fuel expenses are high because the drilling, 
excavating, loading and hauling machinery is heavy and thus consumes vast 
amounts of petroleum based fuel. Mining operations are continuous making daily fuel 
consumption high. A group procurement manager illustrating the point stated; 
„If you think about your Caterpillar truck,… … your average fuel consumption 
[during typical mining operations] is about between 95 litres to 100litres per 
hour and you can work it out if you have 30 trucks, 24 hours a day , 360 days 
a year.. …… that excludes the loaders.‟ (Interview, November 2009). 
 
Also included under the fuel expenses label are petroleum based lubricants which 
are supplied by fuel suppliers. Tanzania hosts a number of global major petroleum 
firms like BP, Shell and Oryx Petroleum. These international firms have depots in 
Tanzania but do not have processing plants. Value addition in Tanzania comprises of 
packaging lubricants into manageable containers (breaking imported bulk).  
 
The mining firms stated that fuel purchases were best negotiated from head office as 
supply contracts often covered their entire global operations. The firms argued that 
centralized negotiations gave them direct access to the petroleum firms availing 




5.6 The processing plant 
 
The processing plant hardware is erected at the mine construction sub-chain. The 
hardware is designed to last the entire production life cycle. During operations the 
plant consumes spares for ancillary machinery and consumables as well. The study 
sought to identify the suppliers of ancillary machinery spares and consumables and 
to document how the suppliers have changed over time. In addition it sought to 
identify any domestic value addition. Only one of the three mining house responded. 
Tables 8 and 9 summarise this response. 
 
The Tables indicate that the majority of suppliers are from Australia and South Africa. 
The two countries have established mining processing plant spares, components and 
consumables manufacturing capacity and capabilities. Suppliers from Tanzania were 
subsidiaries of MNCs. The tables also indicate a stable supplier base confirming 
procurement management staff preference of suppliers with proven capacities and 
capabilities. To mitigate the risk of buying in appropriate supplier mining firms often 
had long supply contracts with proven suppliers hence the stable supplier base 
indicated in Tables 8 and 9. 
 
There was virtually no local value addition in the supplies. The machinery, 
components, spares and consumables were imported in a ready-for-use form.  
However, quicklime (Table 8) a consumable used in the processing of gold is mined, 
processed and packaged in Tanzania. It is produced by Athi River Mining Company a 
firms with its head offices in Nairobi, Kenya. Other Tanzanian consumable suppliers 
are the petroleum product supplying firms discussed above.  
 
Table 6: Processing plant consumables purchases at an unnamed Tanzanian 
gold mine. 
Firm Head Office Scope of service Change of supplier 
(2005-2009) 
Electrical consumables 
EWI Perth, Australia Supply of lights, lugs, tape 
and electrical tools 
No change 
Ross Industries Perth, Australia Supply of lights, lugs, tape 
and electrical tools 
No change 




Fuchs Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Supply of lubricants No change 
Allied Tanzania Mwanza, Tanzania Supply of bearings, jaw 
liners, linertex, and gear 
box parts 
No change 
Wea Warman South Africa Supply of pump parts No change 
ITT Flygt South Africa Supply of pump parts No change 
Mets Minerals South Africa Supply of wear liners No change 
Sandvik Material Handle Sweden Supply of conveyors 
spares 
No change 
Goodyear South Africa Supply of conveyor belts No change 
Mantrac Multinational Supply of forklift spares No change 
Lift Rite Australia Supply of forklift spares No change 
Chemical consumables 
Athi River Mining Limited Kenya Supply of quicklime No change 
Australian Gold Reagent Australia Supply of sodium nitrate No change 
Name withheld United Kingdom Supply of lead nitrate No change 




Table 7:  Processing plant ancillary products purchases by an unnamed 
Tanzanian goldmine. 
Firm Head Office Supplies Change of supplier 
(2005-2009) 
Electrical  goods 
ABB and ABB and Koyo Australia Motors, variable speed 
drives and PLCs 
No change 
Pierlite Australia Security lights No change 
EWI Australia Motors and cables No change 
East African Cables Tanzania Cables No change 
Mechanical goods 
SPX Process Engineering South Africa Gear boxes and agi 
blades 
No change 
Wea Warman South Africa Warman pumps No change 
Flygt South Africa Flygt pumps No change 
Light vehicles 
Telex Australia Franna crane No change 
Liebherr Liebherr crane South Africa No change 
Lift Rite Manitou Australia No change 
Mantrac Tanzania Forklifts (DP30) and Cat 
424 D loaders 
No change 
Source: This table is based on interviews with an unnamed mining firm in Tanzania 
(2010). 
 
The output of the mine site processing plant is gold dorè that requires further 
processing in gold refineries. Transporting gold dorè from a mine site to a refinery is 
a major security operation. The mining firms stated that gold dorè was transported by 
aeroplanes from the mines to the refineries but would not provide details of the firms 
involved. AGA refines its gold in South Africa at the Rand Refinery in Germiston. A 
discussion with the refinery revealed that the refinery provides transport and security 
from the mine to the refinery. A Rand Refinery respondent commented; 
„We will pick up the gold from the mine to the airport and to the refinery. We 
offer that as a one stop service to our clients.‟ (Interview, November 2010).  
 
For security reasons mining house were reluctant to discuss the issues concerning 
the transportation of gold dorè to the refineries. 
 
5.7 Other production linkages 
 
Operating mines often function as communities linked to a number of services 
available to society at large. 
 
First and very important to a mine is security. Security serves to safeguard mine 
assets which include capital equipment, consumables, gold reserves and the 
produced gold dorè. The six large-scale gold mining operations in Tanzania are 
located in relatively remote places making security a linkage of critical importance. 
Mining firms have lost gold dorè, gold ore stockpile and fuel. For instance in 2007 the 
North Mara mine is reported to have lost about two million litres of diesel fuel due to 
theft. In September 2008 criminals carrying AK-47 assault rifles attempted to access 
the mine‟s gold room. A Barrick security guard was shot dead in this incident. These 
and other incidences raise the spectre of vulnerability of gold mines and hence the 
importance of the security linkage. 
 
37 
Mine visits indicated three levels of security. The first level of security concerns 
controlling access to the mine-site.  In each of the visited mines entry into the mine 
site is controlled and restricted to authorized personnel. Personnel operating at this 
security level are Tanzanian citizens employed by Tanzania domicile security firms. 
Securing these vast spaces is a challenge for mining houses. One mine reported 
engaging the communities along its site perimeters as a source of security 
intelligence and first security barrier. The second level of security is the security 
barrier around the mine residences, workshops, machinery shades and warehouses. 
In the two mines visited these security posts were manned by Tanzania personnel 
regulating and documenting personnel and machinery movements into and out of 
these premises. The majority of firms at this level were reportedly largely owned by 
Tanzania resident expatriates from South Africa and Zimbabwe.  
 
The third and most sophisticated security level is that around the offices, the mine pit, 
processing plant and the gold dorè storage premises areas. Access to these sites is 
strictly limited to relevant personnel. Security measures at this level employ 
electronic devices to enhance operations. All personnel leaving the mine pit and 
processing plant area are subjected to metal detection searches. This level of 
security is largely the preserve of international security firms. In the two mines visited 
the international security firm Group 4 Security (G4S) personnel manned entry and 
exit points at this level or carrying out other security functions. All though the lower 
level guards at this level were Tanzanian citizens, supervision and management 
personnel were largely expatriates from South Africa. 
 
A second service to security is the catering and camp (residential premises) facilities 
management at mine sites. Goldstuck and Hughes (2010:44) note that the technical 
demands of modern large-scale mining operations call for highly qualified personnel 
and to recruit these skills to remote mining sites, firms often provide comfortable 
accommodation facilities and international standard catering facilities at these sites. 
An operations manager in one of the mines remarked; 
„We work 12 hours a day, 7 days a week for 8 weeks……. We have to house 
our guys well otherwise they won‟t come [take the employment offers]. We 
also have to feed them well, it‟s a hard job but a well fed miner is a happy 
miner!‟ (Interview, February 2010). 
 
Catering for expatriate and senior mines personnel is largely undertaken by of 
international catering firms such as Sodexho and All Terrain Services (ATR). These 
firms usual have worldwide operations. For instance, Sodexho caters for the Barrick 
Gold mining group globally. International catering firms are engaged because of their 
experience in „catering for different tastes.‟ Sodexho‟s country manager in Tanzania 
remarked; 
„… … catering is very critical for miners. It is a fickle business, we have to 
cater for different tastes, for example a South African menu, an Australian 
menu, a Tanzanian menu and so forth, it needs experience.‟ (Interview, 
December 2009).  
 
The catering industry purchases both locally and regionally. Locally the firms 
indicated that they purchased fresh produce (fruits and vegetables) from 
communities around the mines.  Sodexho stated that they support community 
horticulture projects that supply their business. Supporting these community ensures 
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that the purchases remain local. The firm has a strict definition of local. Referring to 
the firm‟s contract at the North Mara mine the Sodexho‟s country manager said; 
„Sodexho defines local purchases for North Mara as from the region [Tarime 
region] and will not buy from traders buying from other regions for re-sale to 
us. We can buy from there ourselves so why buy from a trader.‟ (Interview, 
December 2009). 
 
The camp management function involves housekeeping in the residential sites. The 
mining firms stated they often engaged communities around the mines in this linkage. 
In the two mines visited local women were observed cleaning the residences and the 
men attending to the gardens and other general maintenance work like painting and 
plumbing.  Management in both mines stated that this was a means of integrating the 
local communities.  
 
The third ancillary service is the provision of transport. Mining firms routinely provide 
transport to employees not accommodated in the mine-site residences. Mining firms 
have standing contracts with local bus owners and firms to provide transport to and 
from the mine. The fourth and final ancillary service is the supply of office provisions. 
These comprise stationery and office equipment like computers, printers and 
facsimile machines. All the three mining houses stated that all stationery and some 
office equipment were sourced from Tanzanian traders. The firms stated that they 
maintained a vendor list and that all purchases were subject to the „three quotations 
rule‟, that is buyers had to seek quotations from at least three suppliers before 
making a purchase.  
 
Tanzania‟s stationery manufacturing industry is largely limited to paper product such 
a writing pads and books. The country does not produce printing paper, computers, 
printers, staplers and related office stationery. In addition the locally produced office 
furniture range is also limited. The mining firms stated that local suppliers imported 
such supplies and that they bought from these importers allowing for supplier 
margins that cover import duties, transport, overheads and profit. Supporting local 
importers is a programme initiated and supported by Tanzania Investment Centre in 
collaboration with the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD). The two organisations stated that they were running a supplier 
development program aimed at introducing Tanzanian citizens to the latest 
technologies through supporting import programmes. The organisation argued that 
the move was to ensure that even if goods used in the sector were imported, the 
country‟s citizens benefited by being the importers instead of foreigners. Their 
argument was that perhaps that could transfer technology and skills later on when 
importers sought to service and maintain some of the imported equipment. 
 
5.8 Determinant of linkages; mining firms and suppliers views. 
 
Mining houses were asked to identify critical factors they considered in selecting 
goods and services suppliers. Similarly suppliers were also asked to identify factors 
they considered critical for winning tenders and getting orders. The respondents were 
asked to define and explain their own factors (here after referred to as critical 
success factors (CSF see section 5.4). The aim was to compare and contrast the 
buyers and sellers CSF. In addition both groups were asked to rank these CSF on a 
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scale of one to seven where one was the score of least importance and seven as 
score of highest importance. 
 
The mining firms mentioned six CSF as follows; (i) Capability; defined as the ability 
to timely and correctly deliver the required service or product, (ii) Price; defined as 
the cost of purchasing goods and services, (iii) Financial state of the supplier; 
defined as the ability of a supplier to fund its supplies without resorting to advance 
payment, (iv) Back up; defined as the ability to guarantee goods and services in 
cases of failure of stated goods and service to meet stated objectives, (v) Track 
record; defined as a traceable history in supplying specific products and services. 
Track record was particularly desired for the „big hitting stuff‟ like heavy mining 
equipment, reagents and chemicals used in the mine and (vi) Safety policy; defined 
as a measure of safety records and policy suppliers. This was critical for service 
providers who have to work on mine-sites. 
 
Goods and services providers mentioned two CSF; track record and capability (as 
defined in the exploration sub-chain). They also mentioned two order-qualifying 
factors quality defined as meeting or surpassing customer expectations in delivering 
goods and services and ethics defined as following established business practices 
and acting honestly in all dealings14.   
 
Figure 10 provides a graphical representation of average scores awarded by two of 
the responding groups, the buyers and sellers.  
 
Figure 10: Comparison of buyers and sellers Critical Success Factors scores.  
Source: This figure is based on interviews with procurement managers in mining 
firms and suppliers of goods and services to the mining firms (Interviews 2010). 
 
The figure indicates that mining houses rank highly the capability, track record and 
financial position of suppliers when adjudicating tenders or selecting vendors. The 
price of these goods and services was rated lowly and the suppliers did not even 
mention it. The common view was that the prices of mining goods was internationally 
                                                          
14
 Terry Hill (2000:36-39) make a distinction between order qualifiers and order winners. This Report 




















determined, different countries effected adjustments to suit local conditions and the 
range of adjustment rates was established. A mine purchasing manager commented;  
„... .... the price is not as important because we allow for a marked increase 
allowing for importation and transport that we will have to do in any case to 
import it from abroad...‟ (Interview, February, 2010). 
 
Although both capability and track record were commonly mentioned by both the 
buyers and sellers the two ranked the two factors differently. Buyers ranked both 
factors higher than the suppliers indicating the difference of focus between the 
suppliers and buyers. The graph also indicates the gap that the suppliers have to 
work on to meet buyers needs. In particular it indicates that suppliers have to 
highlight their financial position and ability back up their supplies whilst maintaining 
and improving their other positive attributes. 
 
In addition to identifying the CSF, the study also sought to identify the geographical 
location of goods and services providers to the county‟s gold mining sector. 
 
5.9 Spatial distribution and classification of suppliers. 
 
The study sought to identify the geographic location of the suppliers of goods and 
services to the gold mining sector and also track any shifts in spatial distribution of 
suppliers. The spatial distribution of suppliers was divided into geographic regions as 
in Tanzania, the EAC, SADC, the rest of Africa and international (meaning anywhere 
outside Africa). In Tanzania the locations were classified as within a 20 kilometre 
radius of the mine, within the country region (political map) and anywhere else in 
Tanzania. Only one mining firm out of three responded. Table 10 summarizes the 
response indicating the spatial distribution of the registered goods and services 
providers similar to that of the exploration sub-chain source (see figure 8). 
 
Table 8: Spatial distribution of suppliers (as a % of number of suppliers) in an 
unnamed mine in Tanzania. 
Location Registered goods vendors  
(% of total registered vendors) 
 Registered services vendors  
(% of total registered vendors) 
 2000 2005 2009 2012 
projected 
2000 2005 2009 2012 
projected 
Immediate (within a 20km radius of 
mine) 
n/a 18 17.5 17.6 n/a n/a 18.9 n/a 
Regional (e.g. Kahama or Geita) n/a 11 20 25.6 n/a n/a 6.5 n/a 
National (rest of Tanzania excluding 
liquid fuel) 
n/a 3.6 15.6 19.6 n/a n/a 19.6 n/a 
National (Rest of Tanzania, liquid 
fuel) 
n/a 0.9 0.3 0.3 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
East African Community n/a 2.7 3.2 4.5 n/a n/a 1.5 n/a 
SADC n/a 12.6 16.2 n/a n/a n/a 34 n/a 
Rest of Africa n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Rest of the World n/a 49.5 29.8 32 n/a n/a 19.6 n/a 
Total n/a 100 100 100 n/a n/a 100 n/a 
Source: This table is based on interviews with an unnamed mining firm in Tanzania 
(2010). 
 
Table 10 indicates that the percentage of  local registered goods vendors (excluding 
fuel) grew from 33% of the in 2005 to 53% in 2009 and the firm projected that local 
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vendors will make up to 60% its registered vendors by 2012. Whereas the mining 
firm projected growth in registered vendors under the Tanzania excluding liquid fuel 
label from 15.6% in 2009 to 19.6% in 2012, suppliers within a 20km radius of the 
mine appear to have reached a maximum. One reason could be that the 
communities with a 20km radius being largely rural limited to supplying agricultural 
produce only. Registered goods vendors from outside on the other hand Tanzania 
declined from 65% in 2005 to 49% in 2009 and is further projected to decline to 37% 
in 2012.The shift in trends in favour of local suppliers was attributed to the mining 
firm buying goods from local importers. This transferred stock holding from the 
mining firms to the local importers impacting the explorers and mining firms‟ cash 
flows positively. 
 
The trend on the supply of services could not be ascertained because of the non 
availability of data. However, year 2009 data indicates that suppliers from outside 
Tanzania dominated supplies with 55% representation in number of registered 
services vendors.  
 
In addition the enquiry sought to define the purchased products and services in two 
dimensions; complexity and criticality with each parameter rated as either high or 
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Figure 11: Classification of purchased goods. 








•General maintenance and cleaning of 
residential complexes
•Catering services




Low  criticality High criticality
Figure 12: Classification of purchased services. 
Source: This figure is based on interviews with mining firms in Tanzania (Interviews 
2010). 
 
Using a geographical classification used to identify the location of goods and service 
provider in sub-section 5.4.1 (Figure 8 page 30), the results indicate that goods and 
services classified as highly complex and highly critical were largely sourced from the 
international markets outside Africa. Goods in this group include heavy mining 
equipment supplied by OEMs, spares for this machinery and specialized chemicals 
not produced in Africa (Figure 11). South Africa a country with OEM assembly plants 
was mentioned as the regional source of these goods with. 
 
The servicing of this machinery under the supplier and maintenance contracts was 
also classified as a highly complex and highly critical undertaking (Figure 12). Also 
classified similarly was the third level security around the processing plant and the 
gold ore (unprocessed) and processed gold dorè. Third level security was classified 
as such because some mine has been victims of robberies losing gold dorè, fuel and 
machinery in the process.  
 
The firms regarded the mining and plant spares as a low complexity and high 
criticality goods (Figure 11). As a result they allowed local importers to supply these 
as a means of reducing their own stock holding. With no local value addition on the 
spares the practice only serves to transfer stock holding from the mining firms to 
suppliers. Also in this quadrant were vehicle spares bulk chemicals like lime and 
fuels and lubricants. The majority of goods in this quadrant were imported with no 
local value addition except for lime which is mined, processed and packaged locally 
and lubricants that are imported in bulk and repackaged in smaller containers locally. 
Services in this quadrant (Figure 12) included the level two security large concerned 
with immobile mining equipment. Interestingly contract drilling, blasting and hauling 
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was also said to be a low complex but highly critical service. The service was said to 
be of low complexity because the mining firms guided the drill sites and blasting 
techniques guided by geological skills. A mine geologist explained; 
„We guide them [Contract miners] where to drill following the gold, the number 
of holes and the blasting so we can have the rock sizes the plant can handle 
and also so that the pit or tunnel does not collapse…‟ (Interview, February 
2010). 
 
The majority of goods and services in this quadrant were from regional sources with 
South Africa dominating the supplies. Mining firms were however reluctant to provide 
numerical indication of this domination.  
 
Local purchases were largely confined to the low complex and low critical quadrants 
for both goods and services. In the case of goods the supply purchase was limited to 
food and beverages (Figure 11). Even then the firms often imported branded food 
and beverages to meet the tastes of its expatriate staff. Responding goods and 
service providers however could not classify the products and services in a similar 
manner stating that they did not view the goods and services they provide in these 
dimensions 
 
An interesting development was that a number of firms were establishing agencies to 
serve a range of industries in the country. Mantrac for instance serves mining firms 
and road construction and maintenance firms as well. Often these agencies served to 
import machinery and component with no local value addition outside the logistic 
linkages.  
 
 Although evidence indicates limited local linkage in the two sub-chains, both the 
exploration and mining firms stated willingness to engage local supplies. They 
however clearly stated that engagement was dependent on the suppliers meeting 
stated conditions, the CSF. The next section looks the nature and extent of linkages 
as driven by the interaction of these CSF and the six MMCP issues. 
 
6.0 To what extent do MMCP hypotheses explain the extent 
and diffusion of backward linkages in Tanzania’s gold 
mining sector? 
 
In section 3.1 the study posited that the nature and extent of linkages in the gold 
mining sector of Tanzania is a function of six variables. Findings indicate that the six 
variables underline the nature and extent of linkages in the sector. 
 
Notwithstanding the poor state of both soft and hard infrastructure in Tanzania, the 
weak institutional capacity and the inadequate supply of skills (particularly in the 
immediate post liberalisation period), This report argues that policy is the main driver 
and/or determinant of linkages in Tanzania‟s gold mining sector amongst the six 
MMCP variables. Using a one to five scale where one is not important and five most 
important, the policy factor scores maximum five. Figure 13 below shows a graphic 
representation of scores per variable based on the author‟s judgement arising from 




Figure 13: Ranking of MMCP linkage drivers. 
Source: This figure is the author‟s perception of the six MMCP issues. 
 
The definition of the meaning of policy is fluid (see Smith, 2003 and Torjman, 2005 
for example). However, generally, policy is defined as a plan to guide action towards 
concerted goals and/or objectives.  
 
Policy occurs in two spheres, namely the public sphere and private sphere. In the 
public sphere, policy is the domain of government and it can derive from central or 
national level, regional level and local level (country, province or city). Public policy 
concerns laws, regulations, decisions and actions. In the private sector sphere, policy 
concerns business strategy formulation and execution. 
 
Public sector policy is the main driver of development of basic social infrastructure, 
including education and technical skills, roads, power and water supply, 
telecommunication, and NSI in general, which are critical for the development of 
linkages between the mining industry and the local economy. The current scarcity of 
these resources in Tanzania is limiting the potential of development of linkages. That 
is why infrastructure and skills factors are awarded the score four and the NSI factor 
is awarded the score three because a functional NSI can be argued to both a cause 
and an end of availability of good infrastructure and relevant skills. Both the 
ownership and impact of regional economies drivers were awarded a low score of 
two because their significance is small compared to the gaps in infrastructure, skills 
and the NSI.  
 
Awarding these scores is not a suggestion of a priority list of prerequisite drivers to 
be adopted by emerging countries seeking to develop local linkages to their natural 
resources sectors. Each of these drivers is a cause as well as an end of the process 
of developing local linkages and as such deserve due care and attention.  
 
Before discussing the policy regime as the major driver of linkages in the gold mining 
sector of Tanzania a detour to broadly outline the policy regimes that have dictated 















6.1 Development Policy changes in Tanzania 
 
Šolar et al (2009: 305), argue that with a few exceptions policies change over time to 
reflect dominant perceptions and realities. The authors further argue that purpose of 
public policy is to direct or control actions by government bodies or the public so as 
to achieve desired ends or objectives.   
 
An examination of changes in the economic development policy regimes in Tanzania 
confirms these arguments. The successive governments of Tanzania since 
independence have always had a vision to bring economic development to the 
citizenry. To attain these objectives the GoT has pursued various programmes under 
different policy regimes. In the immediate post-independence period the government 
retained the policies of the predecessor colonial regime. The economy remained 
market oriented and dominated by the private sector. Even if the government had 
political capacity to alter the policy regime it opted to maintain the doctrine of market 
oriented and private sector dominated means of production.  
 
However the inherited liberal economic policies did not bear the expected „fruits‟ of 
independence for the majority of the people. The disappointing outcomes of the times 
have been attributed to inadequate donor support and deficit in capacity to implement 
government programmes amongst other reasons. Consequently the government 
abandoned the liberal economic policies and opted for a centrally directed economic 
growth policy as did a number of African countries that faced similar challenges. This 
option for centralised planning gave birth to the Arusha Declaration proclaimed in 
196715. The declaration set Tanzania on an African version of socialism trajectory 
dubbed Ujamaa. Under the Ujamaa ideology the government nationalised the 
country‟s major means of production which included gold mines that were operational 
at that time and set agriculture as the projected backbone of the economy. The 
socialist policies however also did not yield the desired results. The nationalised 
enterprises faced challenges that include inadequate technical and managerial 
expertise, over-employment and embezzlement amongst others (Ngowi, 2009). In 
addition to these challenges, the 1978/79 war with the Idi Amin ruled Uganda is 
argued to have worsened a bad economic situation in Tanzania. By the early 1980s 
the economic situation in Tanzania compelled the political leadership to seek 
alternatives to Ujamaa policies.  
 
After initial resisting overtures of assistances from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and opting for home-grown economic reform programmes, the country finally 
formally adopted an IMF supported reform programme in 1986 (Nord et al, 2009). 
Under the programme Tanzania abandoned the state centralised planning approach 
to economic development. Virtually all sector of the economy were opened to 
domestic and foreign private enterprise (ibid).   
 
A typical feature of the reforms in Tanzania is that they have been gradual, steady 
and sustainable. Muganda (2004) argues that sustainability arose from political will to 
reform the economy. She further argues that the process has been gradual because 
                                                          
15
 See The Arusha Declaration (http://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/nyerere/1967/arusha-
declaration.htm- accessed 30 January 2011). 
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the political leadership sought a „wide domestic consensus and a broader 
understanding of issues (ibid).   
 
The current pursuit of economic development in a liberal environment in Tanzania is 
guided by the Tanzania Development Vision 2025, better known as Vision 2025. 
Formulated in 2000 the vision replaced the Arusha Declaration policies of 1967. The 
objectives of Vision 2025 are not different from the aims of the Arusha Declaration. 
Vision 2025 seeks to address the question of poverty through setting the country on 
a sustainable development path. The policy vision also regards agriculture (and 
agro-based industries) as the springboard for sustainable development 
[emphasis added] as did the Arusha Declaration16. Other sectors are not mentioned 
separately but the vision notes the importance of manufacturing and tourism. 
 
However Vision 2025 is operating in a different environment compared to that of the 
Arusha Declaration. Vision 2025 is in a liberal economy in which the country‟s 
economy is open to all players, local or foreign and in an environment in which policy 
making has become internationalised. Mallya (2000) argues that internationalised 
policy making is restricting the policy space of poor countries relative to that of rich 
countries and international finance institutes (IFIs) the reforms. The Arusha 
Declaration in contrast had to implemented in an inwardly looking economy and in 
midst of the cold war.  
 
Despite the discourse on the merits and demerits of reforms Tanzania has steadily 
pursued the reform process, amending its meso-policies17 to reflect the new policy 
thrust. Some of the amended policies include the Trade Policy, the Education Policy 
and central to the study the Mineral Policy amended in 1997 giving birth to the Mining 
Act, 1998 which replaced the 1979 Act. 
 
6.2 The policy factor 
 
An examination of progress made in meeting the objectives of economic reform 
policies objective indicate that in general some of the objectives have been met. 
Tanzania has transformed from an inward focusing economy dominated by state 
ownership of the means of production to a liberal private sector dominated capitalist 
economy. Although macro-economic indicators have been positive on the overall 
some objectives of meso-policies have not been met.  
 
The Mineral Policy of Tanzania, 1997 is the result of the economic liberalisation 
strategy of 1986 and is part of the meso-policies formulated to realise the objectives 
of Vision 2025. In the 1997 mineral policy, the GoT acknowledges the important role 
that the mineral sector in meeting the objectives of Vision 2025. The GoT recognizes 
the need for an „internationally competitive investment environment for the mineral 
sector‟ (Mineral Policy of Tanzania, 1997: 1) and the potential that the minerals 
sector offers to achieving rapid national economic recovery and development 
(Mineral Policy of Tanzania, 1997: v).  The policy had a vision of developing a strong, 
vibrant, well organised private mining sector led, large and small-scale mining 
industry contributing in excess of 10% of the country‟s GDP.  
                                                          
16
 See the Tanzania Trade Policy, 2003 
17
 Meso-policies are sector policies. These are targeted policies such as industrial policy 
environmental policy, education policy and technology policy. 
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The policy demonstrates political will to develop linkages in the sector. It articulates a 
vision of developing mineral sector support services and facilities. Section 3.3.10 of 
the policy makes reference to a vision of integrating mining into the national 
economy, (Mineral Policy of Tanzania 1997:19-20). In essence this is vision of 
developing local linkages to the sector. The section makes a tacit reference to 
backward linkages stating a vision of „Developing the country‟s ability to provide 
essential inputs to the mining sector.‟ Discussions with government official suggest 
that this meant developing both backward and forward linkages. However Section 
3.3.10 later explicitly makes reference to forward linkages in points 3.3.10 (ii) and 
3.3.10(iii) of the section which make reference to the need to offer incentives that 
promote local mineral beneficiation investments through the development of value 
adding activities. The GoT has demonstrated political will to develop linkages in the 
sector. The objectives of the Mineral Policy, 1997 indicate political will. However the 
objectives of these and other sections of the Mineral Policy of Tanzania, 1997 lack 
specific targets. In addition there are no specific incentives for achieving the 
objectives and equally no sanctions for failure to achieve them, presenting a policy 
implementation conundrum. In the introduction a book titled „Mining in Africa; 
Regulation and Development‟ Bonnie Campbell (2009) argues that regulatory reform 
frameworks introduced in a number of African countries are of external origin. She 
argues that the African countries have not had much input in policy formulation. 
Instead multilateral funders like the World Bank and the IMF and mining MNC have 
had a dominating role.  
 
The reform experience in Tanzania however indicates otherwise, Tanzania at first 
turned down IMF assistance due to differences in reform policy perspectives. 
Although the IMF was engaged later on, Tanzania still sought to retain a degree of 
control in the reform process leading to a suspension of assistance by major funders 
of the reform process. The impasse was finally dealt with in a review process now 
know as the Helleiner process18. The events leading to the Helleiner process 
contradict Campbell‟s (2009) analysis. Instead the events demonstrate Tanzania 
ability to „stand up‟ to external funders. In the aftermath of the Helleiner process one 
would have expected Tanzania to negotiate from a stronger position resulting in 
meso-policies that mirror government objectives. However and surprisingly some 
provisions in the Mining Act of Tanzania, 1998 indicate a bias towards imported 
goods and services compared to local supplies. This suggests that Tanzania did not 
capitalise on the momentum gained by concessions gained by the Helleiner process. 
As a result, local linkages are limited to low rent activities such as the supply of food 
and beverages. The high rent activities like the supply and servicing of highly 
technical goods and services are dominated by foreign suppliers (good and services 
in the right hand quadrants see Figures 7, 11 and 12). This study thus posits that the 
nature and extent of linkages in the country‟s large-scale gold mining sector is a 
result of the policy regime.  
 
First, policy goals are ambiguous, setting general goals instead of specific goals. For 
instance the policy states the need to develop local linkages but does not specify 
what sort of linkages and set not targets. It also lacks the incentives and sanction 
                                                          
18
 The process was an initiative of the Danish government in agreement with the Tanzanian authorities 
to evaluate Tanzania-donor relations during 1994. It was led by Professor Jerry Helleiner from the 
University of Toronto and had Professors Ndulu (currently the Governor of The Bank of Tanzania), 
and Lipumba of Tanzania and Professor Svendsen of Denmark. 
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instruments.  This is in contrast with the South African Mining Charter that has 
specific goals in term of supplies, local value addition and human resources with 
regard to historical disadvantaged South Africans. In addition the Mineral Act 1998 
placed no statutory obligations on miners and explores to develop local supplies. If 
anything the Act instead grants imports tax exemptions on specific imports effectively 
limiting the need to develop local supplies. The development of these supply 
capabilities is an effort that involves both the private and the public sector. The public 
sector usually plays a leading role in providing public goods developing the critical 
mass human capacity and the private sector usually assist develop specific 
capabilities to satisfy its specific needs. 
   
Second the policies exhibit some incoherencies19. For instance although the country 
has broad objectives to develop local human capabilities the government is allowing 
expatriate labour into the sector. MDAs agreed between government and mining 
firms at times even include the anchor firm‟s contractor and sub-contractor labour 
requirements for the entire life of a mine. Although this guarantees the miner 
unrestricted supply to world class supplies it limits the local access to these supplies.  
Third some policies set to assist develop local capabilities have not been met. Policy 
objectives have not progressed beyond the rhetoric. For instance although miners, 
explorers and suppliers agree that there has been improvement in the quality and 
quantity of infrastructure in Tanzania they also point out that the developments have 
not been enough to attract investment in the manufacturing sector. Utilities supplies 
continue to be erratic and inadequate thus discouraging investment in the sector. 
Various proposed infrastructure projects have not been implemented. Roads leading 
to some mines remain unpaved and some mines like the Geita Gold Mine are yet to 
be connected to the national electricity grid. Government attributes this to lack of 
financial means to develop this and related infrastructure.  
 
Fourth, import tax and duty exemptions on imported goods, spares and components 
is not extended to importers of raw materials destined for local fabrication of similar 
goods, spare and components. This renders local fabricated supplies expensive 
compared to imports. 
 
Buyers firms‟ (miners and explorers) policies are also a critical determinant of the 
nature and extent of linkages in the two sub-chains. In work examining about the 
Japanese car-maker Toyota, Cusumano (1985) demonstrates how a bed-rock firm 
can develop an efficient and reliable supplier base as means of improving 
efficiencies. Evidence from discussion with procurement managers of the mining 
firms indicates that firm policy determines purchasing decisions. Interesting all the 
procurement managers expressed the desire to purchase locally. The managers 
stated that importing goods and services was very expensive. Importing goods often 
led to firms holding up to six months stock of critical suppliers to mitigate logistical 
deficiencies of timely supplies if stock holding was low. They also stated that 
imported services also attracted a premium charges as service providers included 
the cost of their own logistics as well. However despite these concerns none of the 
mining firms have well developed and explicit policies of developing local capabilities. 
Developing local linkages appears to be a personal effort reflecting individual 
                                                          
19
 The coherence and mutual supportive character of policies in this discussion is limited to examining 
the main objectives of the Mineral Policy(1997), the Trade Policy (2003), the Education  and Training 
Policy (1995) and Vision 2025 objectives. 
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preferences. Interestingly all the responding procurement department staff in the 
three mining firms responded as „we‟ to all issues but the „we‟ changed to „I‟ when 
responding to developing local supply bases. Typical responses were; 
„I have not looked into that [developing local suppliers]” or “Its something I do 
when I have time…‟ (Interviews,  February 2010).  
 
However the mining firms stated that local value addition was not their key concern. 
The firms support and buy goods from local suppliers as a means of reducing their 
own stock holdings. Local suppliers attributed the lack of supplier development 
programmes to the mining and explorer firms‟ modus operandi. Typically expatriate 
employees work in Tanzania for about eight weeks before going back to their 
countries for a four week break. In the eight weeks the employees work 12 hours a 
day without day-offs. With such a tight work schedule key decision makers in the 
procurement department have limited time to explore local capabilities. In addition 
the suppliers stated that procurement personnel are risk averse because of the 
incentives structure by the buyer firms. They stated that key decision makers in the 
procurement departments have incentive linked targets and were thus not prepared 
to risk engaging new suppliers that could jeopardise their incentives. The 
procurement personnel however denied this stating that they were instead by the 
aforementioned CSF irrespective of the source of supply of goods and services.  
 
Only one firm, ABG had evidence of a supplier development programme. ABG has 
run a number of workshops in Dar es Salaam and Mwanza. In the workshops the firm 
informed potential suppliers on procedures to register as a vendor and the 
determinants of successful registration. In addition an engineering firm in Mwanza 
(name withheld) stated that they had received limited capacity development 
assistance also from ABG.  
 
The policy dimension (both public and private), its implementation or lack of 
implementation because of various reasons, its coherencies and incoherencies and, 
goal clarity and ambiguities impacts the other MMCP variables leading to the current 
nature and extent of linkages in the country‟s gold mining sector. The policy 
dimension through these five MMCP issues influences the ability of existing local 
firms and the development of new firms capable of meeting the CSF as defined by 
the buyers; the explorers and the miners. Table 11 summarises the interaction 
between the six MMCP issues (independent variables) and the CSF (dependent 
variables) giving rise to the nature and extent of linkage in Tanzania‟s exploration 
and production linkages sub-chains of the gold mining value chain. In the table, XXX 
denotes a strong interaction between independent and dependent variable XX 
indicates moderate interaction and X denotes weak on no apparent interactions. The 
distribution of the number of Xs is based on the author‟s judgement. Subsequent 
discussions are limited to strongest interaction of independent and dependent 





Table 9: The interaction of independent (MMCP) variables and the critical 















Ownership XXX XXX X X X X X X 
Skills XXX XX XXX X X XX XX XX 
NSI XXX XX X X X XX X XX 
Infrastructure XX XX X X X XXX X XX 
Regional 
impact 
XXX XX X X X X X X 
Source: This table is the author‟s weighting of the six MMCP issues.  
 
The policy variable drives the other five MMPC (independent) variables and the 
identified dependent variables to impact the extent and nature of the exploration and 
production sub-chains linkages as follows: 
 
(i) Ownership 
At the time of the study the ownership of bed-rock firms and their respective suppliers 
in the two sub-chains exhibited an interesting contrast. Whereas all the bed-rock 
production firms are of foreign origin the exploration field comprises of both foreign 
and local firms.  Also service supplies appear to have developed more local linkages 
in the exploration sub-chain than in the production sub-chain. Two factors give rise to 
the status quo. 
 
First economic liberalisation opened the economy to both foreign and local private 
enterprise. The Mineral Act of Tanzania, 1998 has specific provisions specifying and 
differentiating conditions that govern local and foreign private sector enterprise 
participation in the exploration and production sub-chains bed-rock activities 
(exploration and mining). 
 
As a result local and foreign firms have established operations in the two sub-chains. 
Alongside the anchor firms suppliers have also set-up operations to provide goods 
and services to the two sub-chain anchors. Again the distribution of these supplies 
exhibit more local linkages in the exploration sub-chain compared to the production 
sub-chain.   
 
The second reason for the status quo is the differing capital intensity of anchor 
activities in the two sub-chains. Production comprises of capital intensive linkages 
such as drilling, blasting, loading and hauling. Mine production machinery is not only 
costly to purchase but also costly to operate and maintain. A mining firm procurement 
manager used the fuel consumption of loading and hauling vehicles to illustrate the 
point. Besides high operational costs, production is preceded by the expensive mine 
construction linkage. The construction of some mines exceeds US$1 billion, a high 
upfront cost beyond the reach of local players. Foreign firms usually have access to 
relatively cheaper funding sources and access to own reserves to finance some of 
these costs. Additionally, operating large-scale mining operations demands high and 
in some cases specific technical capacities and capabilities. Local firms lack these 
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capabilities and capacities. When Tanzania liberalised its economy foreign firms with 
the appropriate capacities and capabilities seized the opportunity at the expense of 
local firms, deficit in these attributes. Under the Ujamaa policies the mining sector 
was not a priority. As result in the Ujamaa era mining related capabilities and 
capacities were not adequately developed and nurtured to compete at a global level. 
With no capacity, capabilities and no track-record in the field local firms are also 
unable to attract funding in the field.  Although the Mineral Policy recognises the 
importance of financing activities in the sector a proposed programme to finance 
local firms in the sector is yet to be implemented.  
 
Exploration on the other hand is relatively less capital intensive [emphasis added]. 
Exploration tasks like desk bound work such as target and area selection only require 
capital equipments such as computers and finance to purchase geological data from 
GST in addition to expertise in the field. Field-based work like gathering geological 
data although risky are financially less demanding compared to constructing and 
running a mine. Besides exploration fieldwork does not require expensive 
infrastructure expenditure. Explorers are often only concerned with accessing 
selected explorations site and gathering data as samples, photographs and other 
related forms. In their work explorers often use hired equipment to collect data and 
establish temporary field operating bases. Also promising exploration projects often 
change hands. Holders of exploration rights often proceed with exploration processes 
as far as their technical and financial capabilities and capacities allow and thereafter 
either dispose off these projects or go into partnership with better endowed explorers. 
Better endowed explorers often buy exploration projects from smaller firms without 
the financial and technical capability and work on them up to the bankable feasibility 
study (BFS) linkage.  
 
A relatively lower entry barrier in a liberal environment that allows profitable disposal 
of projects has seen a number local as firms or individuals securing exploration 
claims. In 2010 an exploration expert estimated there were about 1200 local claim 
holders (Spencer, 2010). An interesting feature is that the majority of this group of 
claim holders neither have the financial nor technical capacities and capabilities to 
carryout exploration work. Often they dispose these claims in part or in whole to firms 
and individuals with the prerequisite capacity and capabilities. Allowing local claim 
holders to sell their claims to either local or foreign buyer contradicts sector policy 
aims of ensuring that Tanzanian citizens retain a post liberalisation a stake in the 
industry. Often the buyers of these claims are foreign owned exploration majors or 
juniors. ABG acknowledges the practice of buying primary licences from the locals. 
The firms‟ prospectus notes; 
„Because the application for and ownership of primary mining licences under 
the Mining Act is restricted to Tanzanian citizens or corporate entities 
comprised entirely of Tanzanian citizens, the ABG Group does not hold any 
licences of this type. It has, however, over the years entered into various 
arrangements with holders of such mineral rights to facilitate surrender of their 
rights. In some instances the arrangements that have been agreed to 
necessitate only a surrender of the primary mining licence to which such 
Tanzanian citizens were entitled, so that the rights held by the Barrick Group 
under the prospecting licence covering the same area could dominate. … …  
Compensation to the holder of the primary mining licence most generally 
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included both cash payment and grant of a royalty right on future gold 
production.‟ (African Barrick Gold plc Prospectus 2010:90). 
 
The status in the ownership of goods and service supplier firms is also a function of 
the policy regimes. On liberalising the economy Tanzania had a weak manufacturing 
base in general and the situation with mining related supplies industry was even 
worse. The mining sector was not an Ujamaa priority that prioritised agro-based 
industry. Growth in the mining related manufacturing and services industry has not 
been forthcoming for a number of reasons. Although the policy specifically calls for 
the development of mineral sector supporting industry the call is yet to materialise. 
However some Tanzanian owned drilling services firms have been established, but 
there in no local value addition on spares and components of machinery used in 
these services. A common practise in Tanzania is that suppliers and buyers of heavy 
machinery enter into supply and service contracts. As a result spares and 
components are imported only to be fitted into the machinery with no local value 
additions. 
 
The policy has no specific value addition targets for machinery, spares and 
components. Instead legislation in Tanzania grants unrestricted imports of certain 
goods and services to the sector. However importers of raw materials for local 
fabrication and assembly of components, spares and equipment are not exempt from 
duty payments. This practice renders locally fabricated good expensive compared to 
imports. In a liberal environment which allows duty exempt imports this implies that 
local manufactures have limited opportunities to build a good supplier track-record 
and prove their capabilities (CSFs of integrating into the sub-chain) on the because 
of uncompetitive pricing that has to include import duties.  
This generous access to imports is not only restricted to goods but is also open to 
diffuse supply of skills. 
 
 
(ii) Skills and labour spillovers 
Literature, (for example Czelusta and Wright, 2002 and Goldstuck and Hughes, 
2009) argues that modern large-scale mining and its supporting manufacturing, 
processing and services industries are skills-intensive sectors. Skills determine 
capability and ceteris paribus, capability delivers high quality product and services, 
leading repeat purchases that build a good track record. For both buyers and 
producers of goods and services, appropriate skills often manifest in efficient 
operations leading to improve profitability that ceteris paribus gives a firms a strong 
financial fundamentals. Goods and services providers often pass efficiency saving to 
buyers as reduced prices for high quality goods and services. 
 
The infant large-scale mining sector of Tanzania is characterized by a skills deficit 
that the government acknowledges. To mitigate skills deficit the Mineral Policy 
(1997:20) called for the establishment of training institutions in relevant core and 
industry supporting skills and motivating foreign investors in the field to train 
Tanzanians in the skills developing the requisite skills. Tanzania has a number of 
training institutions offering both generic and specific mining related training. Three 
institution offer specific mining industry related education and training.  First, there is 
the University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM). The UDSM offers mining related course 
through the geology department and the College of Engineering and Technology 
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(CoET) both at bachelor‟s degree level. The geology department however also offers 
limited postgraduate studies at Masters Degree level.  In the majority of cases 
postgraduate education was pursued abroad largely through donor-funded 
scholarships channelled through the MEM. The ministry and private sector reported a 
trend of staff movement from the private sector to the ministry in order to access the 
post graduate study opportunities. UDSM staff stated that the mining boom in 
Tanzania had resulted in an increase in enrolment in mining related studies. 
 
Second the country has a specific geological sciences and mining sciences 
institution, the Madini Institute in Dodoma20 awarding diplomas. The institute works 
closely with the MEM and the GST in training staff and conducting geological projects 
in country.  Third, ABG and AGA in collaboration with the Tanzanian Chamber of 
Minerals and Energy (TCME) and Vocational Education and Training Authority 
(VETA) have embarked on a technical training project named the Integrated Mining 
Technical Training (IMTT). The programme is specifically designed to train artisans 
(tradesmen) and is resident at the Moshi VETA institute.  Authorities at these three 
institutions were reluctant to provide numerical evidence of the institutions graduates. 
Even with these training efforts, experienced mining related skills were said to be in 
deficit. Although the mining and exploration firms did not provide numerical data on 
recruitment and training expenditure indicating their engagement of Tanzanian 
citizens the firms instead expressed concern about inter-mine staff movements. 
Complaints were that staff often moved to „greener pasture‟ after intensive in-house 
training. A geologist with one of the major explores stated;  
„…..I have seen firsthand how much [many] of the local Tanzanians we have 
lost the first year I was here. … I have seen [I saw] 7 or 8 geologist resigning 
in 2007 because of that [high demand for trained and experienced geologists].  
They were just being poached and paid higher salaries.‟ (Interview, February, 
2009). 
 
Besides inter-firm skills movements concerns were raised about what was referred to 
as „noticeable‟ skills emigration. The UDSM, the MEM, the explorers and the mining 
firms all confirmed a trend of mineral sector qualified Tanzania citizens opting to work 
abroad.  It was reported that this was because of the wage differential between 
similarly qualified Tanzanians and expatriates. The head of the geology department 
at the UDSM confirmed that some graduates from the university were working in 
South Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo, China and Australia. The wage 
differential is company level policy. Firms acknowledged this stating that premium 
wages for expatriate was a common worldwide practice used to attract high calibre 
skills. Any interesting observation is that although the Mineral Policy calls for the 
developing local skills it however has no strategy to retain the skills. In effect large-
scale miners through Mining Development Agreements (MDA) often negotiate 
agreements that allow unrestricted expatriate labour for themselves and their service 
providers. For instance the Policy Forum in a publication titled „The demystification of 
mining contracts in Tanzania‟ (undated) cites the Tulawaka and Buzwagi (both ABG 
mine) MDA clauses pertaining to labour rights as granting the two mines, their 
contractors and sub-contractors the freedom to employ non-Tanzanians. The clause 
further states that the GoT will „expeditiously grant such persons all necessary work 
permits, visas and passes for this purpose‟ (Policy Forum, undated: 3). Such 
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guarantees of access to expatriate labour are often valid for a mine‟s life span as 
they do not have provisions limiting expatriate terms of employment in Tanzania. 
Such clauses contradict the objectives of developing local competencies.  
 
The Mining Act, 1998 has no specific time, numerical and level targets for Tanzania 
nationals in the firms operating in the industry. The mineral policy although calling for 
the development of local competencies has no targets and milestones to measure 
progress in that regard. This lack of specific targets is a sharp contrast with the South 
African Mining Charter. The Charter aims to benefit Historical Disadvantaged South 
Africans (HDSA) with specific targets of 40% HDSA employment at management 
level within 5 years of Charter publication and sets other targets at all levels. In 
addition the Charter has specific tax incentives and sanctions for successes and 
failures. The lack of specific targets in Tanzania places no legal pressure on firms to 
develop local expertise other than an intra-firm desire (if at all) to control the wage bill 
and appease political concerns if any. This defeats the purpose of producing skills 
because even when produced locals have limited prospects of practice.  The 
perception is that this is limiting career progression of experienced Tanzanian 
personnel. A Tanzanian national employed by one of the mining firms remarked; 
„We (Tanzanian) can do some of the work they [expatriates] are doing, but we 
are ignored. May be it‟s because we don‟t speak good English.‟ (Interview, 
February 2010). 
 
On the other hand who is know if he is correct or the responded is underestimating 
his weaknesses. 
 
Nevertheless there is all parties agree that there is a shortage of local skilled and 
experienced labour at all levels. To mitigate the current local skills deficits the GoT 
permits firms to engage skilled and experienced expatriates. As a result highly 
technical posts in the industry are largely held by expatriates. Observations at the 
visited mines, exploration firms and suppliers indicate that Tanzanian citizens are 
engaged in the engineering, exploration and purchasing departments but largely as 
junior staff following in-house training and development programmes. 
 
The skills deficit in Tanzania has limited the opportunities of skills from the mining 
sector migrating to other sector of the economy. The general feeling was that the 
mining sector offered better wages compared to other sectors of the economy. In 
addition to limited opportunities in other sectors, the emigration of skills has limited 
the possibilities of skills migrating to other economic sectors. Instead the mining 
sector was drawing skills from other sectors. The most notable and acknowledged 
skills migration was the flow of logistics and purchasing skills moving from other 
sectors to the mining field. The general feeling was that the industry was still „young‟ 
with less than 15 years post-liberalization large-scale private sector led mining 
experience. The feeling was that the industry first had to address local skills and 
experience deficits before spillovers could occur.   
 
Instead of skills spilling over to other industries they tended to stay within the sector 
with experienced personnel establishing firms offering services to the sector. 
However even such occurrences were very limited. The study identified three such 
firms, all exploration firms, Zari Exploration, Gold finders and an unnamed firm 
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(referred to by the head of geology at the UDSM) as firms that were formed by the 
ex- mining firms‟ employees.    
 
Freeman (1995) and Lundvall et al., (2003) show that economic development is not 
driven by merely having the adequate and appropriate skills and infrastructure. 
These authors argue that economic development is more the accumulation of 
knowledge through discoveries, inventions improvements, perfections and extortions 
of previous and current generations.  Their work indicates that successful economies 
are characterized by complex integrated systems of new knowledge and innovation 
in productive economic activities and refer to these systems as National Systems of 
Innovation, (NSI). 
 
(iii) National systems of innovation 
It is accepted that innovation is one of the most important sources of competitive 
advantage and long-term economic growth in all countries. The NSI provides a useful 
analytical framework for assessing the drivers of innovation (OECD, 1997 and 
Habiyaremye, 2005).  
 
The NSI assists countries and regions to develop strong capabilities through 
communication links between technology users and developers (as machinery, 
components and services). With this communication links ceteris paribus the 
developers of technologies grow their clientele and build good track records. A large 
clientele often gives rise to economies of scale that also in-turn allows the technology 
developers to offer competitive prices for their innovative products and services. 
Strong communication links also give birth to good back-up systems. Perhaps most 
importantly good communications links allow technology developers and users to 
overcome unforeseen shortcomings of existing technologies and also further 
innovations.  
 
The Mineral Policy, 1997 suggests in Tanzania the government is aware of the 
importance of a functional NSI in efforts to generate high rent local mining sector 
linkages. The policy articulates a vision of establishing „centres of technical 
excellence in various fields for capacity building, and setting up mechanisms for 
exchange of knowledge and experience‟ (Mineral Policy of Tanzania 1997:21). The 
policy acknowledges that government has a role in facilitating and promoting linkages 
among universities, colleges, research institutions and industry „for the productive 
utilization of their inter-dependencies for mineral sector development‟ (Mineral Policy, 
1997:28). This policy vision is coherent with the vision of the Tanzania Commission 
for Science and Technology (COSTECH) of coordinating science and technology 
research and application for the development of Tanzania perhaps indicating 
government‟s greater vision of a functional NSI. Evidence however indicates that this 
vision is yet to be implemented. First there are no centres of excellence to support 
the mining industry in Tanzania. The UDSM, the Madini Institute and the Moshi VETA 
Institute although offering mining sector specific courses, all have limited capacity to 
produce adequate skilled manpower. They also have limited research capacities and 
capabilities. There is very limited technologically advanced mining related research is 
conducted from within Tanzania. Neither the UDSM nor MEM could point out specific 
highly technical mining research. Instead they stated that local research was largely 
focused on lowly technical artisanal mining technologies. As a result the country had 
no mining related patents. The country is more concerned (and perhaps rightly so) 
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with generating adequate generic and sector specific skills. An exploration manager 
summarized the lack of coordinated efforts between the various sectors saying; 
„I don‟t see the enthusiasm of the University to make a follow up and get 
feedback from the industry…. People in the universities are expected to make 
greater contribution [to the sector] but were not there (yet).‟ (Interview, 
January, 2009). 
 
Second there is limited interaction between various sectors to bring to fruition the 
policy vision of an exchange of ideas. The most mentioned platform of interaction 
between universities and the mining sector was that of undergraduate students 
receiving training from the mines as part of the curriculum and the students 
conducting firm sponsored research projects as part of their final year undergraduate 
studies.  An exploration manager with a mining firm referred to this interaction as 
“minor and inadequate”. 
 
Evidence although limited also indicates that the vision is not apparent through other 
sectors critical for the development of local linkage. For instance a discussion with 
the MTIM indicated the ministry had no specific program for the mining sector. Also 
the countries industrial research body‟s website Tanzania Industrial Research and 
Development (TIRDO) body does not mention mining sector research and 
development of linkages in the sector21. It is a cause for concern that the MTIM, 
parent ministry of industrialisation efforts has no specific action plan to support the 
countries fastest growing sector. This lack of shared vision particularly in government 
departments is source of policy implementation challenges.  
 
Setting up centres of technical excellence in various fields for capacity building, and 
setting up mechanisms for exchange of knowledge and experience demands 
adequate and reliable infrastructure.  Without adequate and reliable soft and hard 
infrastructure efforts to establish these centres are both difficult and futile. 
 
(iv) Infrastructure 
A broad range of literature (e.g. Calderón and Servén, 2004 and, Canning and 
Pedroni 2004) concludes that there is a positive relationship between the stock of 
infrastructure assets and the rate of economic growth. The literature argues that the 
strongest growth impacts come from development of telecommunications, road and 
electricity networks. Work by Isard et al., 1998 and Eggert, 2001 demonstrate this 
positive relation with reference to the mineral sector. The work argues that an 
adequate supply of infrastructure services is an essential ingredient for mineral 
sector driven economic growth. 
 
Good infrastructure has a large bearing on the cost of doing business. The 
manufacturing industry needs adequate infrastructure to economically produce and 
distribute its output locally and externally. The poor state of infrastructure in Tanzania 
is extensively documented (see Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) 
2009; Mgwabati, 2010). The low level of both soft and hard infrastructure provision is 
constraining Tanzania‟s manufacturing capabilities. Miners and explorers stated that 
under the prevailing state of infrastructure manufacturing firms were reluctant to 
establish operations in the country. 
                                                          
21
 http://www.tirdo.org/projects.htm.  (Accessed 6 January, 2011) 
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The GoT recognizes the importance of developing infrastructure. The Mineral Policy 
(1997: 17) explicitly states a vision for a „Well developed and reliable economic and 
social infrastructural facilities, such as transport; water supply; power supply; 
communication … ‟ (Mineral Policy of Tanzania, 1997:17). 
 
Mining firms and explorers although noting and acknowledging „massive‟ 
infrastructure delivery improvement over the past decade stated that inadequate, 
unreliable and poor infrastructure in Tanzania increased their operations cost. The 
firms stated that government had not delivered the promised infrastructure. As a 
result the firms stated that often they engaged in infrastructure development and 
maintenance projects such as maintaining roads and setting up power lines. The 
firms stated that these were expensive undertaking that were supposed to be 
government funded and implemented but they occasional engaged in to facilitate 
their own core operations. Mining firms‟ machinery and personnel were observed 
carrying out road maintenance work on some roads. In effect mining firms maintained 
sections of roads that this author observed were better maintained that state 
maintained sections.  
 
Public sector officials pointed out two major reasons hindering the development of 
adequate and appropriate infrastructure. The first was the oft-mentioned reason of 
insufficient financial resources to develop and maintain adequate and reliable 
infrastructure. The second reason was political considerations hijacking economic 
objectives in infrastructure development projects.  The concern of political needs 
superceding the economic need was corroborated by a consulting engineer. The 
engineer stated that at times infrastructure development programmes were dictated 
by political considerations which divert infrastructure project such as the building of 
roads and providing electricity to anchor projects such as mine were to providing the 
infrastructure to the electorate particularly in immediate pre-election periods. 
 
Notwithstanding inadequate financial resources to simultaneously engage in a 
number of infrastructure development projects Tanzania needs formulate and 
implement coherent policies that will assist the development of adequate 
infrastructure that supports the growth local linkages. To develop appropriate 
infrastructure that will attract manufacturing investments calls for well coordinated 
and coherent programmes between the various government agencies at local and 
national level. Coherent plans and implementations are likely to result in reliable, 
adequate and well maintained roads, rail, telecommunications, water and sewerage 
facilities in the towns and cities and the remote mine site locations.  
 
(v) Regional determinants 
Despite Tanzania‟s rising status as a gold producer the country‟s economy has 
generally remained dependent on agriculture as the backbone of the economy, 
employing over 85% of the working population.  Local productivity levels in mining 
linkages and other manufacturing sectors remain low with limited efforts at mobilizing 
domestic resources to promote robust and sustainable development. Mining industry 
contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) estimated to be around 3.5% is a far 
cry from the government target of 10%.    
 
The low levels of local linkages to the country‟s gold mining industry reflects 
Tanzania‟s proximity to regional economic powers in an era of globalization and free 
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trade. These economic powers have more developed capabilities to produce the 
majority of upstream and downstream inputs to Tanzania‟s mining industry value 
chain. These capabilities have been developed over a number of years leading to 
long established relationship with some of the mining firms operating in Tanzania.  
These mining firms exploit these relationships to source goods and services aided by 
continually declining transport costs. Furthermore the economies of scale of 
supplying local, regional and international markets reduce the incentive to set up 
linkage bases in Tanzania.   
 
The regional challenge to developing linkages in Tanzania arises from four countries. 
First there is Kenya, a regional EAC economic power with a developing horticulture 
and food processing industry. The country is one of the main sources of processed 
food condiments and beverages with a market in Tanzania. In the mine canteens, 
Kenyan fruit juices and processed food are a common sight. Kenya has developed its 
food processing and horticulture to serve European and Middle East markets and 
has found a market in Tanzania. 
 
Second there is Zimbabwe, a declining economic power with a mining history. A 
number of international mining firms had established operations in Zimbabwe prior to 
the economic and political turmoil there. Some of the firms have retained operations 
there but expanding their markets to a Tanzania a country „catching up‟ with some of 
its neighbouring countries. An example of Zimbabwean sourced linkage was ground-
based geophysical work by Geophysics GPR from Zimbabwe. In addition and despite 
economic challenges Zimbabwe still runs a School of Mines in Bulawayo and some 
of the graduates and experienced mining personnel are also engaged full-time or as 
contractors in Tanzania‟s mining sector.  
 
Third, there is Zambia with a history in mining lying in its Copper mining industry. 
Some experienced skilled labour, trained in Zambia is now practising in Tanzania. In 
addition the mining related programmes at the CoTEC in the UDSM are reported to 
have been guided by programmes from Universities in Zambia (CoTEC respondent, 
2010).  
 
Fourth and finally South Africa, a country which has a developed mining sector as 
well as a developed supplier sector. The suppliers include both goods (capital 
equipment, spare and consumables) and a wide range of generic and specialist 
services. A large number of South African firms have had experience in operations in 
less developed countries north of its border (see Economic Commission for Africa, 
ECA, 2004). Interviewed purchasing managers stated that South African firms have 
built a reputation of being capable, adequately backed up and cost effective suppliers 
to remote and emerging mining zones in Southern and West Africa. This reputation 
has proven attractive to Tanzanian operations, coupled with efficient and cost 
effective logistic, goods and services from South Africa still land in Tanzania at 
competitive prices.  
 
As long as Tanzania is committed to a liberal economy it will continue to face not only 
the challenge of these regional power-houses but also the traditional challenge of 
Western Europe, Australia, North America and China an emerging mining OEM 
supplier. Tanzania is a member of the EAC, SADC and the World Trade Organisation 
who members are committed to free trade with minimal non-tariff barrier and other 
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forms of protecting nascent home industries. Tanzania thus faces the challenge of 
finding policy space to champion the development a stronger and sustainable local 
manufacturing base capable of competing regionally and internationally. The 
question is how does the country face the challenge and what policies can be 
formulated to achieve this?  
 
As if the challenge of developing local linkages in the presence of powerful regional 
and international economies is not steep, Tanzania also faces the challenge of 
effecting development programmes under conditions of good governance. Good 
governance manifests as security of tenure, property rights, and the rule of law and 
low levels of corruption. This study focuses on the corruption attribute in Tanzania 
because it a pressing and topical issue in the economic development discourse. 
 
(v) Corruption 
Transparency International (TI) measurements of global corruption levels indicate 
that corruption is rampant in Tanzania. From the period 2000 to 2010 Tanzania has 
consistently scored a low three out of ten on the TI Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI)22. Despite this, our study encountered no evidence of corruption in the mining 
sector in general and the large-scale gold mining sector in particular and in their 
linkages to local goods and service providers. This does not mean that corruption 
was not a constraining factor, but rather that we encountered no evidence of its 
significance. Both private and public sector players were reluctant to discuss the 
subject. Allegations of corruption in Tanzania were largely confined to „pub talk,‟ and 
were directed at street level bureaucrats23 on one hand and senior level bureaucrats 
and politicians on the other.   
 
Allegations directed at street level bureaucrats singled out police officers and 
customs staff handling imported spares, machinery and consumables at the port. 
Police officers manning the road-blocks in the major roads were said to be 
demanding bribes from transport operators. This was said to be increasing the cost 
of logistics as transporters were factoring these charges on to their logistic charges. 
There were also allegations that importers often had to bribe customs department 
officials to speedily clear imported material adding to the cost of doing business in 
Tanzania. Khan and Gray (2009) describe this type of corruption as predatory 
corruption which is characterised by extortion and theft by public officials. If anything, 
by increasing the costs of imports, this type of petty corruption is an inducement to 
local sourcing. However because of limited capacity and capabilities the supply 
industry in Tanzania has not seized the opportunity. 
 
Allegations against senior level bureaucrats and politicians were that this group was 
benefiting from the secrecy that surrounded operations in the sector. The secrecy 
around the mining development agreements (MDAs) and the freedom given to the 
Minister of Minerals and Energy to negotiate the agreements as stated in Section 10 
of the 1998 Act fed the corruption rumour mill even without concrete evidence. The 
reluctance of the GoT to disclose the full details of the MDA and Section 21 of the 
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1998 Act which criminalises disclosure of information obtained form a mining licence 
holder add fuel to this rumour mill. Despite concerns on Section 21 of the Act the 
Corruption Tracker24 reports that provisions of this section are retained under Section 
25 of the amended 2010 Act. The implications are that politicians, senior level 
bureaucrats, and private sector players have much to conceal, hence retention of the 
provisions. Legal developments in the USA (the Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act) that make it compulsory for all energy and mining 
companies registered with the US Stock Exchanges to disclose publicly not only what 
they pay to the US government, but also what is paid to foreign oil, gas and mineral 
producing countries like Tanzania are likely to reveal some details of the MDAs and 
revenue streams accruing to the host governments. A major point of interest will be 
the reaction of the host governments and the mining houses. In addition there are 
questions as to how Tanzania, a country that had previously and successfully 
resisted some aspects of Bretton Woods institutes policies so strongly that mediation 
caused these institutes to revise their mode of engagement with aid receiving 
countries, ended up with a weak mining act, the1998  Act. Campbell (2009:1) argues 
that the effects of such acts in other parts of SSA as well is „…reducing (state) 
institutional capacity, as well as driving down norms and standards in areas of critical 
importance for social and economic development…”. Khan and Gray (2009) argue 
that weak state capacities deprive Tanzania and other like economies the best terms 
for a share of their mineral rents. In Tanzania the gold royalty rate is pegged at 3% 
Net Smelter Return25. The Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency TMAA (2009) shows that 
not only is the rate low compared to other countries such as Canada26 with precious 
metals royalties pegged in the 10-18% of net profits interest range in all provinces 
and Botswana with royalties pegged at 5% of gross market value payable for all 
precious metals but also the royalty calculation approach is open to abuse and 
corruption. The TMAA points out that the Net Smelter Return approach could be 
depriving the country of additional revenue because the deductable allowable costs 
component of the approach is open to corrupt practices of inflating these costs. 
 
Interestingly there were no corruption concerns raised about the issuing of 
prospecting, exploration and mining licence as favouring one group over the other. 
The only and consistent complaints were on the speed of processing these licences. 
The concern is that the process of legal compliance was lengthy. Khan and Gray 
(2009) argue that lengthy bureaucracies give rise to market- constraining corruption. 
In such situations civil servants may solicit bribes in return for speedy processing of 
licences and permits applications. Alternatively and simultaneously private sector 
players may also offer bribes in return for speedy processing of the same licences 
and permits applications.   
 
7.0 Conclusions and recommendations 
 
The impressive growth of large-scale gold mining activities in Tanzania has not 
generated the envisaged objectives. Local goods and service linkages remain limited 
and restricted to low complexity and low criticality goods and services. This is despite 
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 See- www.corruptiontracker.or.tz 
25
 The royalty is calculated as follows;  Royalty = (Royalty Rate) x (Gross Revenue – Allowable Costs) 
26
 Royalties in Canadian provinces are as follows: Quebec 12%; Ontario 10%; British Columbia - 13%; 
Manitoba 18%; Yukon 13%; Nunavut 13%; NWT 13%; Saskatchewan 10% and Alberta 12%. 
Minimum tax in some provinces established through additional minimum taxes. 
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the country‟s mineral policy stating a vision of the mining sector contributing 10% of 
GDP and spurring the development of a mining services industry and manufacturing 
industry producing mining inputs. This study report draws two conclusions on policy 
as the major determinant of the nature and extent of linkages in the large-scale gold 
mining sector of Tanzania as follows; 
 
(i) Cognisant of the lack of human capital and inadequate and reliable infrastructure 
this study concludes that the gap in developing and deepening local linkages to the 
country‟s large-scale gold mining sector is a reflection of failure to translate Vision 
2025 into specific policies with the appropriate sanctions and incentives. The oft-cited 
reason for governments failure to take appropriate action even when faced with 
viable alternative options to deal with contentious issues has been the lack of 
„political will‟(Post et al, 2010). However, this appears not to be the case in Tanzania.  
Tanzania has formulated and modified its developmental policies as circumstances 
dictate. The transformation from the Ujamaa ideology to the current liberal economic 
policy regime spelt out in Vision 2025 demonstrates the will by the political elite to 
act.  This will to act is demonstrated in the macro-policies such as Vision 2025 is also 
translated into meso-policies. Meso-policies such as the Mineral Policy of Tanzania, 
1997 further demonstrate the will to translate grand policies to meso-policies. The 
deficit is the quality of translation from the macro level to the meso-level. 
 
(iii) Notwithstanding intra and inter policies incoherencies, the report concludes that 
there is a policy implementation deficit. Whereas the sector has been liberalised to 
enable access to both local and foreign private enterprise, strategies to develop 
backward (and forward) linkages are yet to be fully implemented. The country has not 
produced adequate skills to services the sector and the manufacturing sector is yet to 
make the envisage inroads into the production of mining inputs. As a result, local 
linkages remain restricted to low rent supplies such as food, beverages and (some) 
camp management services.  
 
This study concludes that policy implementation has been hindered by two factors.  
Firstly, Tanzania does not have the capacity to implement some of its policies. The 
most notable capacity is the financial capacity to built infrastructure, establish a 
strong NSI and support human capital development.  Tanzania is highly dependent 
on external funding to implement some of its developmental goals and also often has 
to rely of external expertise. Dependency on external support for development is 
risky and implies progress is externally determined. The challenge is for the GoT to 
increase its revenue base and generate enough income to fund development 
projects or service loans taken to finance these projects. Secondly, some policies are 
highly ambiguous leading to implementation difficulties. Some of the objectives and 
strategies outlined in the Mineral Policy of Tanzania, 1997 can at best be said to be 
highly ambiguous. The policy does not define specific goals and the implementation 
means and actors in the defined strategies are not specified. Low policy specificity 
may be an indication of lack of capacity or a deliberate effort to avoid conflict. 
However, conflict on the policy goals in Tanzania is very low. Matland (1995) and 
Spector (1997) argue the implementation of such policies usually follows an 
experimental mode which opens the implementation arena to a wide array of 
interested participants. In such environments, policy outcomes are heavily dependent 
on the resources committed to implementation and the stakeholders that decide to 
participate in implementation. Participants‟ level of activity in implementation depends 
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on the intensity of their feelings about the policy, how the implementation impacts on 
the participants‟ other demands amongst a host of variables. There is thus a need to 
focus on developing a policy that has clear goals (as clear as a possible). The 
experimental mode provides rich experiences that Tanzania could use to modify its 
policies. However, in Tanzania the focus of the debate appears to have been 
captured by the issue of minerals royalties rate and the removal of certain import tax 
exemption as in indicated in the draft Mineral Policy of Tanzania, 2009.  
 
Although there are cases of inter and intra policy incoherencies in Tanzania this 
report concludes that the significance of these incoherencies  is small compared to 
the gaps in translation and implementation of  Vision 2025 as specific meso-policies 
with the appropriate sanctions and incentives. The past decades‟ debates on making 
the most out of Tanzania‟s minerals appear to be stuck on the level of royalties rate 
and creating „investor-friendly‟ environments. Consequently this has lead to 
competing countries offering more and more incentives to attract investment. The 
result has been a „race to the bottom‟ with governments playing limited roles and 
realising increasingly less revenue from the sector in an environment of an 
increasingly dissatisfied and restless electorate advocating for government 
intervention. A number of SSA countries have gone through SAPs and have opened 
their markets to foreign and local private sector players. It is highly likely that some of 
these countries face the same challenges as Tanzania in their quest to integrate their 
resources sectors with the rest of the economy through developing sustainable 
linkages. This report concludes that stating clear and realistic policy objectives and 
implementing strategies to achieve these objectives with timely and appropriate 
policy adjustments whenever the need arises, is a major determinant of the nature 
and extent of linkages in a country‟s minerals commodities sector.  
 
Governments in developing countries have often cited the lack of fiscal capability as 
a major reason underlining failure to implement policies. A study of fiscal policies 
directed at the development of basic social infrastructure, including education and 
technical skills, roads, power and water supply, telecommunication, and NSI in 
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